UNITED STATES; DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----x 18-CV-719 (CCR)

BLACK LOVE RESISTS IN THE RUST, et al., Plaintiffs,

VS.

Buffalo, New York CITY OF BUFFALO, et al., October 23, 2024

Defendants.

MOTION HEARING

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHRISTINA CLAIR REISS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

FOR PLAINTIFFS: NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE

BY: CLAUDIA WILNER, ESQ. 50 Broadway, Suite 1500

New York, New York 10004-3821 BY: ANJANA MALHOTRA, ESQ. 275 7th Avenue, Suite 1506 New York, New York 10001

-and-

COVINGTON & BURLING LLP(NY)

BY: CHRISTINE ADRIENNE NELSON, ESQ.

BY: JORDAN SCOTT JOACHIM, ESQ. 620 Eighth Avenue, Suite 4029

New York, New York 10018

-and-

WESTERN NEW YORK LAW CENTER, INC.

BY: MATTHEW ALAN PARHAM, ESQ.

37 Franklin Street 2nd Floor, Suite 210 Buffalo, New York 14203

FOR DEFENDANTS: HODGSON RUSS LLP

BY: HUGH M. RUSS, III, ESQ.

BY: CHEYENNE NICOLE FREELY, ESQ. BY: PETER A. SAHASRABUDHE, ESQ.

The Guaranty Building

140 Pearl Street, Suite 100

Buffalo, New York 14202

COURT REPORTER: Diane S. Martens

dmartensreporter@gmail.com

1 PROCEEDINGS

2 * * *

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

10:05AM

10:05AM

10:06AM

THE CLERK: Your Honor, the matter before the Court is civil case number 18-CV-719, Black Love Resists in the Rust v. City of Buffalo, et al.

Present for the plaintiff are attorneys Claudia Wilner,
Anjana Malhotra, Jordan Joachim, Christine Nelson and
Matthew Parham.

Present for the defendant are attorneys Hugh Russ, Cheyenne Freely and Peter Sahasrabudhe.

And we're here for a hearing on a motion to certify the class.

THE COURT: Good morning.

We have a number of people who are going to join by YouTube. There is no recording per judicial conference policies. Please respect that. My understanding is the YouTube is the first time the Western District of New York has done this. They did it at the parties' request. And it was because our Zoom licenses would have cut off the number of participants. So, please honor that.

And we have all day to do this. So let me ask you, first: If either party plans on presenting evidence?

MS. WILNER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: No.

10:06AM

22

23

25

24

10:06AM

How about from the defendants?

MR. RUSS: No, your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT: And then the way we're going to proceed is moving party, opposition, brief rebuttal.

I'm going to ask that you announce yourself each time you speak not only because we have a number of attorneys but that will help us create a record and it will also help the people who are participating by YouTube.

I have a number of things that I am thinking about. I call them musings. They're not rulings. These are things that are troubling me and I sometimes do this in advance of a hearing to let you know what I am stuck on. You should feel free to push back on it. Don't throw away, don't jettison your entire presentation because I am on some other issue. Don't be hesitant to correct me. These are just some of the things that I'm wondering about.

I'm a very pragmatic person. And, so, it isn't going to help me decide whether or not to grant Class Certification if you tell me something like there is going to be mini-trials or they're common questions of fact and law. I like to hear, if you could, how you think that's going to play out in realtime in terms of motion for summary judgment, could the Fourth Amendment violations be resolved by summary judgment? What would happen at trial in terms of general versus individual

10:06AM

10:06AM

10:07AM 10

10:07AM

10:07AM

10:08AM

damages. That would be the most helpful to me.

10:08AM

10:08AM

10:09AM

10:09AM

10:10AM

10:10AM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

One of the issues in this case is the issue of general damages versus individual damages and I know that's an area of dispute. It's one thing if the plaintiffs' position is everybody was unreasonably detained for both the initial checkpoint and the secondary stop, and I can imagine that would not require individual trials. But if there's going to be individual damages that examine the difference between two tickets for tinted windows versus five tickets or a stop that lasts 20 minutes versus a stop that lasts 45 minutes, then we are really getting into individual inquiries and I don't really see Class Certification providing answers or common evidence in that. So I want to trail down on that, and especially since one perspective, the individual damages in some cases will be de minimis. So what you would get compensated for for getting a tinted window ticket on one occasion when it wasn't, it should not have been issued is not something that I think that we would typically have at trial over an inquiry. So I want to, you know, drill down into the pragmatics of how that would work.

The proposed Class that I am most concerned about is the Traffic Enforcement Class which is roughly defined as Black and/or Latino individuals who have driven their vehicle in the city of Buffalo and an intent to do so in the future.

From the Court's perspective, that looks fairly

10:10AM

10:10AM

10:11AM

10:11AM

10:11AM

10:12AM

limitless. It also would be unusual in terms of injunctive relief. I'm trying to think of how I would fashion it. I would have to think about, okay, what's the checkpoint going to look like in the future because I think everybody agrees that they have ceased. But they haven't been abandoned, they haven't been disavowed so I want to hear more about that Traffic Enforcement Class because that really seems quite unmanageable from the Court's perspective and it just doesn't seem to be mapped on to the problem that brings this case to the court.

We won't be discussing the merits of the case except as they interplay with Class Certification. But I am stumped as to the logic of the checkpoints and I'm looking mostly to the defendants to tell the Court the logic. So the touchtone for the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. And if the idea is that we want to have a checkpoint to intercept crime, to deter crime, then I don't really understand the traffic violation part of it. If it doesn't have anything to do with traffic enforcement, is that some kind of like secondary gratuitous purpose added on to it? And, if so, that seems like a lot of overkill. I'm just kind of wondering about it.

One of the exhibits points this up fairly clearly. I'm looking at Exhibit 58. And it's a email: "BDC Lockwood wants results with this increased daytime detail. All officers should be made aware of this and what is expected of

10:12AM

10:12AM

10:13AM

10:13AM

10:13AM

10:14AM

them in the past. The officers assigned to the daytime detail have always yielded good results and we all expect this to continue into the future."

"BDC Lockwood also wants two traffic checkpoints run during the daytime detail, one of them at approximately 12 noon. As you have all done in the past, the checkpoint locations should be conducted in and around recent areas of violence. For example, if there was a shooting during the previous night at Broadway and Fillmore, then the traffic checkpoint should be conducted in that vicinity."

So that kind of makes no sense to me because unless you're expecting evidence of a crime to be passing through the checkpoint in the 24 or 48 hours after the crime, it just seems to me more a show of police presence in an area that recently expected or suffered, you know, a violent crime. And there's a lot of other ways to do that besides detaining motorists and issuing tickets.

So I know we're kind of into the merits and I know the plaintiffs argue that this was a revenue-generating event on the backs of minority populations in certain housing areas but I'd like to hear from the defendants how it works, how a checkpoint actually was intended to work, and why it works.

There are some issues in this case which I think we could agree on, and from the Court's perspective, a good advocate generally concedes them. For example, I don't

10:14AM

10:14AM

10:15AM

10:15AM

10:15AM

10:16AM

believe there are antagonistic interests among the proposed Classes. So, I've had Class Certifications where -- dairy farmers come to mind -- where some people belong to a coop and some people did not and they really didn't have the same interests. I don't see that problem in this case and I'm wondering if the defendants agree.

I also, as I read through Michael Gennaco's lengthy expert report, I didn't see how failure to train and supervise investigation of the complaints, documentation, recording, discipline of officers was relevant to Class certification and I also wondered how it would even come into the case. So I was wondering why I was reading about all of that in this particular case unless, unless I'm missing something about the claim. So, lots of criticism about what the Buffalo Police Department is doing wrong and how they're responding in the aftermath of police alleged misconduct but it didn't seem to me to go to the core issues. And maybe you just provided it as something that would come up later in the case.

One of the central issues in this case, and maybe the central issue, is the framing of the issue as to whether the stops were unconstitutional as now set up. Never mind who goes through or what happens, this is not a reasonable detention of motorists and the defendant's efforts to push this into, judge, you're going to have to be deciding whether

10:16AM

10:16AM

10:16AM

10:17AM

10:17AM

10:17AM

there's probable cause, you're going to have to look at, you know, whether or not there was an infraction.

I don't see that I will be doing that because the plaintiffs are masters of their complaint and if they're not going to be asking the Court or a jury to do that, I don't see that I would.

The defendants have the better part of the argument, however, when we get into individualized damages. And then I think that you do look at that if you are going to say somebody who was arrested without probable cause suffers the same injury as somebody who was arrested for an outstanding warrant, I'm not so sure I would agree unless the plaintiffs' argument is that it's all fruit of the poisonous tree, it's all the same injury, you are going to recover for every arrest, there's going to be a set amount of recovery that's requested.

So those are just some of the things that are bothering me and, as I said, you should feel free to push back on them and go your own way but those are -- I like to tell you what I'm struggling with first.

Let's start with the plaintiff and remember to announce yourself before you speak.

MS. WILNER: Just one moment, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. WILNER: Good morning. And may it please the Court.

Claudia Wilner for the plaintiffs.

10:17AM

10:18AM

10:18AM

10:18AM

10:19AM

10:19AM

We're here today to seek certification of three Classes in this case challenging longstanding traffic enforcement policies and practices of the Buffalo Police Department that have greatly harmed and continue to harm Black and Latino communities. The claims are earmarked (phonetic) for Class certification. For the damages Class, each damages Class, it is challenging just one policy and practice that has harmed all of the Class members in the same way.

Across the Classes, all of the injunct -- all of the liability questions are common. The injunctive relief that we're requesting for the Traffic Enforcement Class is common to all of the members of that Class. They're all asking the same thing which is reform to policies and practices of the Buffalo Police Department.

For the damages, many of the damages questions are common and there are no significant individual defenses. So I really --

THE COURT: No significant individual defenses, but individual damages. So --

MS. WILNER: Yes.

THE COURT: -- they might have not, you know, we're not going to hear officer by officer why he or she did this but your clients are asking for different kinds of damages. Is that conceded?

10:19AM

10:19AM

10:19AM

10:20AM

10:20AM

10:20AM

MS. WILNER: Yes. Yes. That's true. Some of the damages, categories of damages that they're asking for are common and some are individual. What I had thought made sense in my mind -- but you're the judge so it might not make sense in your mind -- was to walk through the Rule 23 factors for each of the Classes and I've prepared some slides just to help do that. And I'm really happy to -- I mean, if you want to start by talking about damages, we can do that or we can stop when we get to that slide and really go through the different categories of damages and how we see them playing out in the trial in this case.

THE COURT: I'm happy to do it your way.

MS. WILNER: Okay, great. Thanks.

In that case I'll start by talking about the damages Classes. This is a certification under Rule 23(b)(3). We'll start with the Checkpoint Class. We've got almost 4,000 members of this Class. This is people who received a ticket or were arrested at traffic safety vehicle checkpoints. And I know you have asked defendants to comment on how the checkpoints were operated. I can talk a little bit about that from our perspective of what the evidence shows.

The checkpoints were established by formal and directive. They were operated under written guidelines from 2013 to June 2024. The Commissioner chose the checkpoint locations personally. And he placed 78 percent of those

10:20AM	1	checkpoints in Black and Latino communities. So from
	2	June 2014 and after, lieutenants picked checkpoint locations
	3	following his model under his supervision and they put
	4	87 percent of checkpoints in Black and Latino communities.
10:21AM	5	Each checkpoint was operated in the same way under the
	6	directive. So all cars were funneled through the checkpoint
	7	for a first inspection which occurred without any
	8	individualized suspicion. And then some cars were detained
	9	for a secondary inspection and it was after that secondary
10:21AM	10	inspection that tickets and arrests and impounds happened.
	11	And so our Class is seeking damages under the Fourth
	12	Amendment for the unlawful detentions that occurred prior to
	13	the tickets and impounds. And they're seeking damages under
	14	the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Title VI
10:21AM	15	for racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.
	16	And they also have due process claims that are under the
	17	Fourteenth Amendment that concern a structural conflict of
	18	interest and those are actually the same claims that the
	19	tinted windows Class has.
10:22AM	20	THE COURT: So I was listening but I didn't quite catch
	21	it. It's just the initial detention or it's the initial and
	22	the secondary?
	23	MS. WILNER: Well the initial and the secondary, yes.
	24	THE COURT: Okay.
10 0071	0.5	l

MS. WILNER: Under the Fourth Amendment but the Fourth

10:22AM 25

10:22AM 1 Amendment claim, from our perspective, really stops with the 2 ticket and the arrest. So we're not seeking damages under 3 the Fourth Amendment for anything that happened after the moment -- after the detention ends, essentially. 10:22AM 5 All of the liability questions for the Checkpoint Class are common and we listed a number of common questions in our 6 brief and I'm not running away from any of those questions 7 but I wanted to highlight today a few that I think are really 8 9 important. 10:23AM The first is: What was the programmatic purpose for the 10 11 checkpoints? Was it for crime control? High visibility? 12 Was it for traffic safety, as the defendants claim? This is 13 a critical factual question that's going to determine 14 liability and it's common to every single Class member. 15 Another really important question is whether the 10:23AM 16 checkpoint satisfied the special needs exception that the 17 Supreme Court has set forth for limited operation of 18 This

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

10:23AM

10:23AM

checkpoint satisfied the special needs exception that the Supreme Court has set forth for limited operation of administrative checkpoints under certain circumstances. This is a legal question that every single member of the Checkpoints Class is going to have and it will determine for every member of the Class whether they win or whether they lose on the Fourth Amendment claim. Maybe not whether they lose. I'm not sure I'll concede that yet but certainly whether they win.

So, on our Equal Protection and Title VI claims, were

10:23AM

10:24AM

10:24AM

10:24AM

10:25AM

10:25AM

the checkpoints disproportionately placed in Black and Latino neighborhoods? Was the City's choice of checkpoint locations motivated by racial demographics or racial animus? These are the most important questions to determining liability on an Equal Protection claim. And, again, they're common to every Class member because the checkpoints were operated in a centralized way.

The due process claims I'd like to defer a little bit until talking about the Tinted Windows Class but the questions are the same for both Classes and that only underscores the commonality.

And then, of course, because we have claims for municipal liability, we have to establish the requirements of Monell v. Department of Social Services, that requires establishing that all of these things happened under municipal policy, custom or practice and that is going to be, again, a common question for all of the Class members.

Your Honor already shared your thoughts that you don't see disputes between the Class representatives and members of the Class that would disturb findings of typicality and adequacy and I just wanted to confirm our position that that is absolutely the Class.

THE COURT: I also don't see a conflict between your proposed Classes. So, you're not going to, if we had a Traffic Enforcement Class, they aren't going to get something

that would take something away from the Tinted Windows Class.

MS. WILNER: Yes. That's exactly right, your Honor.

And I wanted -- I mean the defendants had raised this point under their discussion of typicality and adequacy was one of their primary points that the case was going to devolve into mini-trials because of this need to determine the individual circumstances of each stop. And from the plaintiffs' perspective, that's absolutely false. So, under the Fourth Amendment, again, we're only seeking damages for unlawful detention.

So there is no need ever in this case to determine whether tickets were supported by probable cause, whether the probable cause justified them, whether they were unjustified, all of that on the merits of the ticket is not going to be relevant to the Fourth Amendment claim.

THE COURT: I agree on the merits of the ticket. Once you get into the secondary inspection, isn't there an inquiry into whether it was justified or not?

MS. WILNER: I don't think so, your Honor, because then we're into our fruit of the poisonous tree argument and the Second Circuit case that's on -- that controls -- and I'm just now blanking on the name of it but it's in our brief -- that said that the causation point was cut off by independent actions of the prosecutor and the judge. And so anything that's happening before then where it's just continued

10:25AM

10:25AM

10:25AM 10

10:26AM 15

10:26AM

10:26AM

10:26AM

10:27AM

10:27AM

10:27AM

10:28AM

10:28AM

actions by the police department is fair game under the Fourth Amendment, and that secondary detention, you know, never would have happened had the car not first been subject to an illegal first detention. So it all flows together into the same.

Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has made it very clear that racial discrimination is actionable even if a stop or a ticket is supported by probable cause. And, so, there's really no need under the Equal Protection Clause again to look into the question of whether the ticket was justified. That's not the question. The question is whether it was motivated by racial animus and that gives rise to harm, regardless of whether there was a legal justification for the action.

I'm going to stop really briefly on ascertainability just in case your Honor has questions about our Class definition. I think there is no ascertainability issue in this case. The Second Circuit standard is really clear: A Class must be defined using objective criteria that establish a membership with definite boundaries.

Our Class definition is up for you on the screen. It clearly does that. There's no administrative feasibility requirement in the Second Circuit. So if there are concerns about Class member identification -- and I don't think there are -- but if there were, that would be something that would

be considered as part of the superiority analysis. It's not a threshold that would impede certification under ascertainability.

And I want to -- well, let me ask before I move on. Are there any other questions that the Court has about the Checkpoints Class or any of the points that we've discussed so far?

THE COURT: Not about the Checkpoint Class.

MS. WILNER: Okay, wonderful.

10:28AM

10:28AM

10:28AM

10:29AM

10:29AM

10:30AM

So let's stop and talk a little bit about the Tinted Windows Class and this Class is challenging the issuance of multiple tinted windows tickets in a single stop. And this was a practice that was directed overwhelming at Black and Latino drivers and that three successive BPD commissioners knew about and intentionally allowed to continue.

The Class is bringing equal protection and title six claims for racial discrimination. It also brings due process claims. Those are structural due process claims that I referenced before. We've had over 6,000 people who have been subjected to these practices that we've identified who meet the Class definition. So there's clearly no numerosity issue.

And I wanted to pause and highlight some of the racial disparities. These are all contained in the expert report of Dr. Bjerk that was submitted in support of the motion.

10:30AM 1 THE COURT: Let me stop you. And in terms of logic --

MS. WILNER: Yeah.

10:30AM

10:30AM

10:30AM

10:31AM

10:31AM

THE COURT: -- why is it multiple tickets as opposed to one ticket? I understand that I've seen the memos where they say let's not engage in overkill, two tickets for tinted windows is enough, you don't need to be doing six.

What was the method to why isn't it one, why is it -- is it always two, is it?

MS. WILNER: Yeah. So in thinking about this Class, and it's, it's a good question because -- and you can see even looking at the numbers with 87 percent of tinted tickets going to Black and Latino drivers, you know, overall, that this was a practice that just at its most basic level was grossly disproportionate. But the issuance of multiple tickets is particularly disturbing and that's because when you're, whether an officer is thinking about a single tinted windows ticket, there could be a factual question, are the windows unlawfully tinted, are there not? But there's no question about once the decision has already been made to stop the car and issue the tickets, then there really shouldn't be a particular reason or a difference in how people are treated at that stop.

And what the evidence shows is that even after within the world of people who are getting tinted windows tickets at all, there is really significant and statistically

significant disparity in terms of who is getting the multiple tickets. So the multiple ticketing rate is 15 percent higher for black and Latino drivers from 2013 to 2020. That, when you're talking about statistics, is a really significant difference and at its height, 90 percent of Black and Latino drivers who received tinted windows tickets at all were receiving multiple tickets in a single stop. And the economic harm that's piled on for that gratuitous ticketing is really damaging.

THE COURT: But to get to dis-proportionality, don't you have to look at, all right, here's all of the cars that are registered to everybody, here's the proportion of them that are registered to Black and Latino drivers. Now we look at the tinted window tickets and that's what we have to look at that, all people with tinted windows. I didn't really see that. Do you think you've done that?

MS. WILNER: I'm....

10:31AM

10:32AM

10:32AM

10:32AM

10:33AM

10:33AM

THE COURT: So otherwise you might be targeting something. It might look like it's disproportionate but it just may be that a certain group of people prefers tinted windows to fuzzy dice or people who have screens that, you know, block out the sunshine for somebody sitting in a car seat. So I didn't see the analysis proceed on that basis and I wondered why not.

MS. WILNER: Oh, yes, that issue actually is addressed

in the Bjerk report and I think it gets at this question of why I focused on multiple tickets as opposed to just ticketing in general.

First of all, I do want to make clear that there actually isn't any evidence in the record and it isn't known what the true overall tinted windows ticketing rate is. But what the data shows --

THE COURT: Isn't --

10:33AM

10:33AM

10:33AM

10:34AM

10:34AM

10:35AM

MS. WILNER: -- is that --

THE COURT: -- the overall tinted windows so you don't even have a baseline of how many people drive with tinted windows and that's why I'm troubled by how you can get down to disproportionate because a true test would say, okay, there's 5,000 people in the city of Buffalo who have cars and 2,000 of them have tinted windows, and of that 2,000, 1,500 belong to Black and Latino drivers. And I just don't see that even Dr. Bjerk does that.

MS. WILNER: Oh, okay, I see what you're saying, your Honor. He, he actually does -- and this is the, this is the -- I think what I was getting at before, trying to get at before but probably was too long-winded, that once you're in looking at multiple ticketing, you're looking only within the universe of people who have been stopped and issued ticketed -- tinted windows tickets.

THE COURT: I follow you. I can see that.

MS. WILNER: And within that universe there's a statistically significant disparity where Black drivers issued at least one ticket, tinted window ticket are statistically more likely to receive multiple tickets than white drivers issued tinted windows tickets.

THE COURT: Okay.

10:35AM

10:35AM

10:35AM

10:35AM

10:36AM

10:36AM

MS. WILNER: So, once you're in that baseline, all those other concerns of what is the population doing in general, how many cars have tinted windows at all, you know, those fall away because the disparity is only among incidents of ticket, tinted window ticket issuance.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. WILNER: But I do want to point out some other things that showed up in the data that I do think are relevant to this. One is that the Bjerk report looked at data prior to the issuance of the strike force and at that time tinted window ticketing was lower and racial disparity -- multiple ticketing was lower and racial disparities in multiple ticketing were lower.

So there was a significant increase not only in tickets but also in disparities with the advent of the strike force that then after the Buffalo traffic violations agency came online magnified even further. So it really does suggest that there was a change in behavior within the Buffalo Police Department. Not -- because there's no reason to suspect, to

think that within those years there was baseline change in the population in terms of who had tinted windows and who had -- didn't.

And there's also no reason to think -- this is getting back to the multiple ticketing disparities -- that there's any reason that, like, for example, nonminority drivers would tint only one window but everyone else would tint three or four windows.

THE COURT: So the narrow focuses: Secondary stop,
multiple tickets between white drivers in the secondary stop
and Black and Latino drivers, white or non-- nonBlack or
nonLatino drivers and whether or not those two Classes can be
compared and is there disproportion there? Just there?

MS. WILNER: I think I need to make a correction because the Tinted Windows Class is not limited to tickets that are issued at checkpoints.

THE COURT: Oh.

10:36AM

10:36AM

10:37AM

10:37AM

10:37AM

10:37AM

MS. WILNER: Some tinted windows tickets were issued at checkpoints but multiple tinted windows ticketing was a common practice that officers did when they were on regular patrol as well as on checkpoints. So our Tinted Windows Tickets Class is covering tinted windows ticketing wherever that happened not only at check points.

THE COURT: So then the comparator is much harder -- like you sold me on the comparator at the secondary stop

because I could imagine in pragmatic terms of we would have all that data, there would be a proportion, you could see it.

When it's roaming around, how are you going to establish that?

MS. WILNER: I think the same points that I made before still apply because, again, we're only looking at disparities within the universe of people who are stopped and ticketed for at least one tinted windows ticket. So it's, the Equal Protection Claim isn't based on the stop. We're not challenging whether the stop was justified, whether tinted windows tickets should have been issued, should not have been issued. The point is that Black drivers were really likely to get four tickets instead of one and that was much less true for white drivers.

THE COURT: All right. So you would characterize this as a non-checkpoint Class? I mean it could be but it would be -- it's much broader than that.

MS. WILNER: Yes, I would say it's much broader than the checkpoints and that shows in the size of the Class. There is more people who were affected by tinted windows tickets than who were affected by checkpoints ticketing. So there could be people who would be members of both Classes. For example, somebody who was issued multiple tinted windows tickets at a checkpoint would be a member of the Checkpoint Class and a member of the Tinted Windows Class. And how we

10:38AM

10:38AM

10:38AM 10

10:38AM

10:39AM

10:39AM

Was an

BLRR, et al vs. City of Buffalo, et al - 18-CV-719

10:39AM 1 see that playing out at trial is that that particular 2 individual would have more opportunities to win liability but 3 we are not expecting to like double-dip, as it were, in any categories of damages. 4 10:39AM 5 Have I answered all your questions? THE COURT: You have. 6 7 MS. WILNER: Okay, great. So I wanted to drill down on some of the questions that 8 9 were raised and I wanted to stop a bit on the due process 10:40AM 10 claim because it is a little bit of a less familiar claim. 11 Arises from the Supreme Court decision in Marshall v. 12 Jerrico. And the Supreme Court said that: "A scheme 13 injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into 14 the enforcement process may raise serious constitutional 15 10:40AM questions." And the Supreme Court made its findings about 16 prosecutors but courts have applied it, as well, to police 17 officers. They hold police officers to the same standard as 18 prosecutors and have found that where a police officer has a 19 personal financial motivation to enforce the criminal law, 10:40AM 20 that that can create a conflict of interest that violates the 21 due process clause. 22 And really importantly for Class certification under the 23 case law, this is an objective inquiry. So the 24 constitutional question that has to be resolved is: Does the

system create an intolerable risk of bias? It's not:

10:40AM

25

10:41AM 1 officer actually biased? Can an officer be proven to be biased? But simply is there an intolerable risk of bias. 2 3 And that question, because it's objective, is going to be the same for every member of the Class. 4 10:41AM 5 So really important common questions that go directly to liability for this claim is whether city policies created an 6 improper pecuniary or financial motivation for officers to 7 enforce traffic laws and issue tickets and, if they did, was 8 9 that conflict of interest so serious that it violates the due 10:41AM 10 process clause? Those are the two most important and Monell 11 liability obviously, as well, for that claim. And every 12 Class member is going to have those same questions. Answering them is going to resolve liability for every single 13 Class member at the same time. 14 15 THE COURT: So if you're not looking at just checkpoint 10:42AM 16 data, though, and you're just looking at officers patrolling 17 and issuing these tickets, I think it's going to be pretty 18 hard to show a financial motive. So, in the checkpoints 19 there is the overtime argument and then when this occurred 10:42AM 20 and how long this occurred and you've got the officers 21 involved and you can figure out the pay. How are you going to prove it as a pragmatic matter for 22

MS. WILNER: Well, it's really the same body of evidence, your Honor, because it has to do with the

23

24

25

10:42AM

more roaming stops?

10:42AM

10:43AM

10:43AM

10:44AM

10:44AM

10:44AM

performance expectations that were set by the Commissioner and those didn't apply only to checkpoints. They applied to practices in general and the overtime expectations. And the tying of overtime possibilities to production, which is essentially a ticketing incentive because officers had the ability -- when tickets are tied to overtime opportunities, with the idea that more tickets justifies more overtime opportunities and also is an expected result of those overtime opportunities, and the overtime is so significant for these officers and some of these officers doubled their salaries by working overtime. Working overtime also not only just expanded their takehome pay but their eventual pension benefits. So there was significant financial opportunity for officers in working overtime.

And if the idea being promulgated from the City is that the more you ticket, the more overtime you can do, then that is a financial conflict of interest, at least our -- that's our belief and what we intend to present to the jury and then what we'll be asking the jury to decide.

THE COURT: So I'm having a hard time distinguishing that from any other police department anywhere, especially in the area of substance due process. It has to be a pretty significant constitutional violation, otherwise the Supreme Court has said go under the Fourth Amendment, that's more specific.

10:44AM

10:45AM

10:45AM

10:45AM

10:46AM

10:46AM

I would assume that most, if not every, police department rewards productivity and offers overtime to the most productive officers who have crime-stopping and crime-intercepting abilities and, so, how is this any different? And looking at the policies, what are you zoning in on as the directive that makes this different from every other police department in the country?

MS. WILNER: Yeah. Thank you for the question.

And with all due respect -- and you can let me know if this is not a satisfactory answer -- but our job is to represent our plaintiffs and to look at the policies and practices of the Buffalo Police Department, and whether those policies and practices violate the due process clause. And, so, I don't think it's an element of our substantive claims how our -- how what happened here may or may not compare to what happened elsewhere.

THE COURT: Well you're asking me to find that this is a financial incentive and I'm pushing back and saying I assume there's a financial incentive in most police departments to be productive -- when I'm thinking about ascertainability in this. And I'm not seeing that this is some unique situation where the Court can say, yeah, we need to have a Class because this is going to zero in on a policy that is particular to the Buffalo Police Department.

MS. WILNER: Well, I do think there are some specific

10:46AM

10:46AM

10:47AM

10:47AM

10:47AM

10:48AM

factors here that are important. I mean, the production expectations were pretty strong, the launch of the Buffalo Traffic Violation Agency which was specifically designed in order to bring in more revenue to the City of Buffalo, the reaction to the installation of the Buffalo Traffic Violations Agency which saw ticketing go up substantially after that came online, the training of officers, that one goal of traffic enforcement was to generate revenue, I think all of those things work together. And really, more importantly, your Honor, from the Class Certification perspective, there's nothing about any of those arguments that's specific to any particular Class member. All of our Class members can make those same claims.

THE COURT: Also one argument is there's no motion to dismiss the due process claims so you don't have to show me that it's plausible at this point in time. As it interplays with the Class, it does become an issue.

MS. WILNER: And we also have yet to have dispositive motions so there -- I, to me, the dispositive motion stage, the trial stage where you're asking, you know, what are the facts -- first, are there disputes of facts and then what are the facts and then applying the law to the facts, that is where the merits of the claim are dealt with and there really aren't any aspects of the merits of these claims that are different from one Class member to the next.

10:48AM

10:48AM

10:49AM

10:49AM

10:49AM

10:50AM

Just quickly on the commonality for the Equal Protection and Title VI claims. The questions are similar as we saw for the Checkpoint Class: Did multiple tinted windows ticketing disproportionately impact Black and Latino drivers? Did City policymakers intentionally permit these practices to continue? And if they did, were those policymaker decisions motivated by race? Those are the key most important questions that we have to deal with in order to prevail on those Equal Protection claims. Again, those are questions that are going to be common to every Class member.

In order to prove intent, we plan to present evidence, circumstantial evidence of intent of the type that the Supreme Court discusses in Arlington Heights, that includes the statistical disparities, that includes the historical context for these decisions -- and we have a social historian who can talk about some of that context. We would be talking about substantive departures from normal police procedures such as the lack of any public safety rationale for issuing multiple tickets when one ticket would essentially accomplish the same thing. And including the Commissioner Derenda's judgment that multiple ticketing was just something that officers did to, quote, pad their numbers. So those are all facts that play into the intent analysis. And, again, those are going to be common to every single Class member.

And I'm going to be discussing the Gennaco Report more

10:50AM

10:50AM

10:51AM

10:51AM

10:51AM

10:52AM

in terms of the Traffic Enforcement Class but this is an example of where some of our police practices experts findings are relevant to making that decision about intent. And the purpose of putting that report now at the Class Certification stage is to demonstrate that his evidence common to every Class member. Each Class member can rely on that same expert report in the same way to prove their claims.

So, of course, for any damages Class, predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) is the critical factor. And in this case I think predominance is pretty easy because as we've discussed when talking about the common questions, all the liability questions are common and each Class member is going to be relying on the same body of evidence in order to establish liability.

So, under the checkpoints, things like the programmatic purpose of the checkpoints, the intent of the Commissioner in establishing checkpoint locations are common. The evidence of discriminatory practices for tinted windows ticketing and the decision to allow that discrimination to continue is common. And overtime incentives and the production incentives are common. So there really aren't liability questions that are going to be specific to any Class member. We don't need to determine whether any particular officers was actually biased because what we're looking at is whether

the system was biased. And we don't need to determine whether there was probable cause or a discriminatory intent at the individual officer level because we're really focused on policies and practices and decisions that are coming from the policy level.

Is there -- no, okay, great. So moving on.

THE COURT: But I will tell both sides if you're going to do a PowerPoint, it's very helpful after we're done if you provide your PowerPoint to the Court. It's a good summary for me when I'm issuing a decision to make sure I've covered the points that you thought were the most important.

MS. WILNER: Yeah. And we have printed out copies so we can provide that and we have copies for the defense, as well, if they would like them.

So I know that the court has a lot of questions on damages. I want to start with really what I consider to be a Hornbook Rule in the Second Circuit that where liability is common, individualized damages are not going to defeat predominance. And I'm relying on In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases for this point but there's actually many, many cases in this Circuit that make the same point. A lot of the damages questions in this case, though, are common.

So I'll start with general damages which is something that we're seeking for unconstitutional detentions under the checkpoints and we're also seeking general damages for the

10:52AM

10:52AM

10:52AM

10:53AM

10:53AM

10:53AM

personal degradation that's involved in racial discrimination.

10:54AM

10:54AM

10:54AM

10:55AM

10:55AM

10:55AM

So the Second Circuit has established this category of damages, general damages in *Kerman v. City of New York* and the idea behind general damages is that they are available "as a matter of law" once the constitutional violation is established, and that the damages are intended to compensate for the inherent nature of the constitutional harm. They are not meant to compensate for individualized damages like emotional distress, lost wages, any of that kind of thing that would have to be pleaded and proved up by each person. It's just --

THE COURT: So you are not seeking any personal injury damages?

MS. WILNER: I'm not saying that, your Honor, but I want to look at each of these categories separately so that we can look at the full scope of damages. And also what I think is really concerning you, which is how am I going to deal as a judge with all these damages and what is the jury going to be looking at?

THE COURT: Well, I have a different -- that is a problem but one of the issues is: It's your complaint --

MS. WILNER: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- you're the master. You get to decide what kind of damages you are seeking. And there used to be

1 kind of a common method, oh, you can't have Class
2 Certification for personal injury cases, it's just not a
3 thing and the courts have said that's not really the rule,
4 that's not how it works out.

But there are fairly few Class Certification cases with personal injuries that are, you know, non-economic. And, so, I am kind of surprised when arguably some of it is de minimis, why we're going down that path.

MS. WILNER: Yeah. I think...

THE COURT: I mean, it's your choice but it is a stumbling block which I could understand if somebody had catastrophic personal injuries like there's no way this isn't going to be a focus of our case. Here, if the generalized injury is you violated my Fourth Amendment rights and that is the core injury and everybody suffers that same injury --

MS. WILNER: Yes.

THE COURT: -- and you're not getting into the degree of outrage, that's a much different case than when we are hearing about the stress or -- I mean, I'm trying to think of what it could be other than emotional distress if you cover the economics.

So tell me a little bit about that.

MS. WILNER: Yeah. And from our perspective we don't think those kinds of damages are likely to be a significant feature. We're not actually aware of any unnamed Class

10:56AM

10:55AM

10:55AM

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

17

18

19

20

21

10:56AM 15

16

10:56AM

22

2324

25

10:57AM

1 members at this point who are planning to assert those kinds 2 of damages and there may be --

10:57AM

10:57AM

10:57AM

10:58AM

10:58AM

10:59AM

THE COURT: But you decide what kind of damages the Class is going to assert with the Class representatives. And, so, to tell the Court this far into the case at Class Certification that, you know, I don't know that the Class members are going to want to pursue this or not, it just kind of hangs out there and then thinking down the path, there will have to be some kind of management tool and we have the supplemental authority about do you decertify at that point, do you not do it, what do you handle with it?

And so, in light of how vague it sounds like this claim is at this point, I'm kind of perplexed as to why it's in the case. That's your business but it is creating an issue that needs to be resolved in terms of is this something that the Court could do in a Class setting?

MS. WILNER: Yeah. Well, if we look at all of the potential damages that there are in this Class, we're seeking general damages. We've also asked for punitive damages and equitable disgorgement, all of those are common forms of damages.

Then we are seeking recovery for economic harms. And the economic harms are going to be things like how much do people pay for checkpoint tickets or multiple tinted windows tickets. How much did they pay in impound fees and those

10:59AM 1 damages are individual. But the city has data and records
2 that already have the amounts calculated for every single
3 Class member. So, even though those economic harms are
4 individual, they're easily calculated and they're the type of
5 individual damages that is very routine and commonplace
6 probably in every damages Class Action.

So I would say like if you're, if you're looking at this as maybe an iceberg or a pyramid, the general damages and the other common damages and the economic harms are going to be most of that period and then very much at the tip of it is this prospect that some Class members may wish to seek individual -- other individual damages on top of that.

THE COURT: Okay.

10:59AM

11:00AM

11:00AM

11:00AM

MS. WILNER: Now --

THE COURT: So say that's going to happen and how is it going to happen. So you're going to have a proof of claim form and they're going to check off I want to pursue the following additional damages and then either the person or the entity that's sorting out the claims, or the Court itself, is going to say there's, you know, there's a thousand people who want additional damages, now I need two trials for those people, how is that going to work practically?

Because --

MS. WILNER: I --

THE COURT: -- it's troubling to me that you're like,

well, they may be asserting these claims. It's your complaint. It's either in there or it's not.

11:00AM

11:01AM

11:01AM

11:01AM

11:02AM

11:02AM

MS. WILNER: You know, I think it's just really hard to tell from this vantage point what that will look like because we haven't had dispositive motions and we haven't had the trial. So we don't even know what are the claims that we will be seeking damages on.

THE COURT: You are in control of all of that. I mean,
I've never had a Class Certification where the nature of
damages is unknown this far into it. You have 99 percent of
what you're asking for but you're not telling me -- and you
don't need to say -- I'm giving up the 1 percent but the
1 percent is what's going to cause the individualized trials
and that's something the Court needs to be realistic about as
to how is that going to work out.

MS. WILNER: Yeah. And, again, this is where I would say that that 1 percent of potential damages is like the tail wagging the dog of this entire Class Certification. And when we get to that point, if we get to that point, we can decide how to handle that category of damages. And there are a lot of options. So, there are -- is the possibility of dividing people into separate groups. There are Special Masters.

Magistrates can be involved. Decertification is an option.

So it's really, I think, going to depend on factors that we don't even know right now and it could be possible that

nobody comes forward to --

THE COURT: Well, how are you --

MS. WILNER: -- assert --

THE COURT: Sorry, I didn't mean to jump on you, especially for the court reporter.

How are you going to determine who's coming forward so it doesn't like -- when I said I was pragmatic, I am thinking about when am I going to know? Is it going to be when the claim form when you let me know? Because it's an issue in the case right now, something that the defendants are concerned about --

MS. WILNER: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- and the Court's concerned about it and when do you foresee this coming up? Because I don't see it coming up on summary judgment. I don't think that's the stage where somebody raises their hand in the air and says, by the way, I want to pursue a separate claim for myself on the following basis. Where do you see it coming up?

MS. WILNER: I think the claim form --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. WILNER: -- would be where these issues would be fleshed out. And we have to remember that there's going to be general damages. People are going to be compensated for their economic harms. So how many people -- and there may be also, and this is something that we haven't discussed, but

11:03AM

11:02AM

11:03AM

12

13

14

15

16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

11:03AM

17

18 19

20

22

23

24

25

11:03AM

21

11:03AM

11:03AM

11:04AM

11:04AM

11:04AM

11:05AM

11:05AM

there may be types of harms that they can't be compensated for in this Class Certification because there's intervening causation so they're not entitled to it or whatever. We haven't gotten to the -- and maybe I messed up the case by bringing in more questions -- I hope not -- but I think the point is that it's, it's really too early right now to know the shape of it.

But through the claim form practice, through the claim

But through the claim form practice, through the claim form we should be able to have an idea of, you know, how many people are we talking about and what is it that they want to present. And we --

THE COURT: That's really not what happens with the claim form, though. So, I mean, I've never seen a claim form that asks potential Class participants after certification -- because that's when it would come out -- what do you want to ask for. So, for example, in the dairy farmers. We had a formula based on milk weight and people provided records of how much milk they produced during a particular time period. There was a formula, this is how much you're entitled to. And there was no, like, category "and what else would you like to complain about that the defendants are doing and seek recovery for". So, have you ever seen that in a claim form?

Another potential option that we've thought about is including something in the notice process that would ask

MS. WILNER: I'm not sure that I have.

people to identify whether or not they thought that they would want to present this category of damages. So I think that there are a number of points in the process where it would be possible to identify whether this is even an issue.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. WILNER: Are there other concerns about damages that have been troubling the Court? No.

Moving on, then, to the other piece of the 23(b)(3) discussion, the superiority analysis. As you know, there are a number of factors that go into the superiority analysis and we discussed many of them in our briefs.

I want to rely on our briefs for a lot of the superiority discussion but I do want to highlight the sheer number of Class members in this case because that, in and of itself, weighs in favor of certification. These -- we've got thousands of people who have identified virtually identical claims and having to litigate those claims one by one by one by one, I mean, that just doesn't make any sense. That would overwhelm the courts. That would overwhelm the city. It would probably overwhelm us, although, you know, we're willing to undertake it if we have to. And if there's no Class action, then the alternative to doing all of those thousands of trials one by one is just to leave thousands of harmed people with no redress for constitutional violations, and that's not an acceptable outcome, either.

11:05AM

11:05AM

11:06AM 10

11:06AM 15

11:07AM

11:07AM

So just given the strong close association of all of these claims that are virtually the same as each other and the number of people who have these claims, the Class action is clearly the superior and the most efficient vehicle for resolving them.

We don't see significant management issues in this Class. Certainly with Class member identification, the process is nearly complete at this point, just a final step. And we think that the best way to proceed with the trial is to phase the trial. So, to begin with the jury determination of liability to the checkpoint and Tinted Windows Class members and have that same jury determine general damages afterwards if we prevail on those claims.

But I want to make sure that I have an opportunity to answer any additional management questions you have.

THE COURT: So management on all checkpoint-based claims seems relatively straightforward and easy. We have the dates and the times and the tickets.

And once you move beyond the checkpoints, then it gets a lot more amorphous and that's what I have been thinking about is when you take it into roving controls and you're essentially asserting the same claims and you have a due process component to it and it will be more difficult to see whether there's any -- that's where I'm kind of getting bogged down.

11:07AM

11:07AM

11:08AM

11:08AM

11:08AM

11:09AM

11:09AM

11:09AM

11:09AM

11:10AM

11:10AM

11:10AM

MS. WILNER: I see. So the Tinted Windows Class is just as ascertainable as the checkpoints Class. And we have a spreadsheet that has on it a list of all of the people who received multiple tinted windows tickets in a single stop. And so identifying the Class members is not going to be a difficulty. And then --

THE COURT: I guess I would just say it's almost a different case and it doesn't mean that you can't bring it but it is -- I understood the crux of the checkpoint, and even the crux of this case, is these checkpoints are targeted to certain neighborhoods and anybody going in or out is going to be detained and it's unconstitutional, it's not reasonable and then to add insult to injury, once they're detained, they get loaded up with traffic violations and it's incentivized and so they are bearing the burden of, you know, paying the overtime.

Once you move beyond that, it is a different type of claim which is, in general, what happens when you have tinted windows because obviously if you get stopped with tinted windows, the officer does not know the race of the driver.

Then we look at the pinpoint of the stop and whether it's one ticket or two tickets or no tickets. And are they recording race in those stops?

MS. WILNER: No, they did not record race in those stops.

THE COURT: So you're doing it on the back-end based on the tickets, right? So --

MS. WILNER: Yes.

11:10AM

11:11AM

11:11AM

11:11AM

11:12AM

11:12AM

THE COURT: -- how would you eliminate people who were stopped and not given a ticket and the officer says you got to take care of that?

MS. WILNER: The Tinted Windows Class -- and maybe let me just go back to the Class definition is defined as: All Black and/or Latino individuals who received multiple tinted windows tickets from the BPD in a single traffic stop on or after June 28, 2015.

So people who were stopped but were not issued a ticket are not members of the Tinted Windows Class.

THE COURT: Right. But I'm trying to figure out how that determination gets made when you're telling me that the race of the driver's not recorded. There's no record of people who were stopped but weren't ticketed and the argument is that you couldn't be stopping these people based on race because you can't see through the tinted windows. And that -- I think that's a very different claim than your checkpoint claim.

So then I'm into a more of a management in terms of is this even a Class or is this -- if you had a policy that said this is what we're trying to accomplish with tinted windows, then it could be directed at the policy but I don't see it as

that black and white in terms of what the policy says.

11:12AM

11:12AM

11:13AM

11:13AM

11:13AM

11:14AM

MS. WILNER: Okay. So, I think there are a few layers here that I'd like to respond to.

First of all, your -- I agreed with your description of the Checkpoints Class but the behavior that you were talking about, the targeting of Black and Latino communities and people for traffic enforcement and ticketing wasn't limited to checkpoints. So the same officers who are doing those checkpoints were also going to those same neighborhoods where the checkpoints were being run and engaging in multiple tinted windows ticketing there. And those -- many of those same practices are still continuing today and that's the focus of the injunctive claims for the Traffic Enforcement Class. And I definitely I know that the Court has concerns about that Class so I want to discuss that a lot.

So there is a spectrum and a pattern of behavior here. From all of that spectrum and pattern of behavior for the damages Class, we selected out two groups of people whose claims could and should be litigated together because they are so similar and they all experienced the same harm and that's people who are harmed by checkpoints and Black and Latino individuals were harmed by multiple tinted windows ticketing.

Now I do want to say that once the officer stops the car and sees the driver and is issuing a tinted windows ticket,

that officer does see the race of the driver.

11:14AM

11:14AM

11:14AM

11:14AM

11:15AM

11:15AM

THE COURT: Agreed. But they if they don't record it, we have no way of knowing.

MS. WILNER: Oh, I see. Well, the City does, actually does --

THE COURT: I just asked you if they did and you said they didn't so.

MS. WILNER: Well, so, it's not quite so straightforward. The Buffalo Police Department does not require officers to record on the race of -- on the ticket, itself, the race of the person being ticketed. They could do that but they don't do that. So it's not on the ticket.

THE COURT: Nor could it be because you wouldn't be able to discern the race without asking a lot of nosy inappropriate questions. Always -- I mean, you couldn't always do that.

MS. WILNER: Right. Well, what our police practices expert has said about that is what officers should do is record their perceived — their impression or their perception of what the person's race is and that what you're actually wanting to do is in that instance is have a record of officers' perceptions. That's really for the second claim, again, the traffic enforcement claim.

But City data actually has matched many of the tickets

11:15AM

11:16AM

11:16AM

11:16AM

11:17AM

11:17AM

to a race because the TraCS system in which -- the tickets are in the system called TraCS but TraCS is a part of a larger system that includes everything that the Buffalo Police Department does and that system is called CHARMS. And CHARMS actually has a lot of race data in it from other situations in which people encountered the justice system and their race was recorded in those other areas because while race is not typically recorded for traffic violations, it is recorded for misdemeanors and other types of encounters that people have with the criminal system.

So, in fact, you can go on the city of Buffalo's website and you can go into their data portal and you can download traffic tickets and it has a field in it for the race of the person ticketed and that race is populated most of the time.

What our data -- and I don't want to go into too much detail on this because I'm worried I'll get it wrong -- but if you look in Dr. Bjerk's report, he used that City data. But he also had another method of assigning race to individuals. I don't want to go too much into detail with it but it is explained in a lot of detail. And the two ways that he did it matched each other.

And, so, we are very confident that we are able to if -going back to the question of manageability -- that we are
able to identify the race of Class members based on the data
that the City has in its possession. And, of course, if

there is a claim form process and if there is a question about a particular individual, it can always be clarified at the proof of claim stage whether or not a person actually is a member of the defined Class. And, of course, that's something that has to happen regardless.

I'm not sure if I was able to, if I, if I got to answering all of your questions about the manageability of this Class.

THE COURT: Let's move on. Yes, you have.

MS. WILNER: Okay. So let's talk about the Traffic Enforcement Class. And I appreciate your Honor sharing your hesitations and my job is to clear up those hesitations.

This is a very different kind of Class because this Class is not seeking damages for past times. We are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for ongoing and future violations. So this is a forward-looking Class. And the certification is under Rule 23(b)(2). And so the focus of this Class is on the policies and the practices of the Buffalo Police Department.

And it is a broader Class definition. But it's okay that it's a broader Class definition because the policies and practices that are at stake affect a broader group of people.

And the injunctive relief that we're ultimately asking for is going to affect and benefit all of that group of people. And there's no particular individualized relief that

11:18AM 10

11:17AM

11:18AM

11:18AM 15

11:19AM

11:19AM

11:19AM

11:20AM

11:20AM

11:20AM

11:21AM

11:21AM

people would be getting as part of this Class. This is about addressing systemic problems with policies and practices of the police department. And --

THE COURT: Do you see a significant difference between the declaratory component and the injunctive component so saying you can't do X, Y or Z that it's a violation of the Fourth Amendment is one thing. Enjoining future behavior based on predicting future events is a different task.

Do you see the -- do you make that distinction yourself?

MS. WILNER: Yes, I do. They are very different.

The standing requirements are the same for the two forms of relief but saying that a constitutional -- that the Constitution has been violated and directing changes in behavior to address the constitutional violation are two different things.

But that kind of redress for constitutional violations is commonly done by courts all across the country and in New York. And we've cited probably six or seven examples in our brief of similar claims for unconstitutional policing practices where courts have redressed those policing practices with injunctive relief and those cases also had similar definitions to the definition in our case.

So this is a large Class. A lot of people are affected by traffic enforcement in the city of Buffalo and because it is prospective, the Class is going to include in it future

11:21AM

11:22AM

11:22AM

11:22AM

11:23AM

11:23AM

members. That's just a nature of the (b)(2) certification always. And so, again, no issues with numerosity.

And, in fact, in its brief, the City conceded all of the 23(a) factors for this Traffic Enforcement Class including --

THE COURT: Whether the City challenges or the defendants challenge numerosity for any of the Classes?

MS. WILNER: They didn't. They didn't. And for this Class they didn't challenge commonality or typicality or adequacy, for that matter.

But commonality is really important for any (b) (2) certification because if the Court is going to be issuing an injunction, it has to insure that it's addressing the same harms and in this case the court would be --

THE COURT: Why does the Court need to have a separate Traffic Enforcement Class? So, I do think the standing requirement is different in terms of an injunction. There needs to be a possibility of a injury that's not shared by the general public and I think that I could order injunctive relief without this Class for the other Classes.

MS. WILNER: I don't believe that's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, if I find, or the jury finds, a violation of the Fourth Amendment and I would have to find that there was some form of prospective harm but I would not need a separate Class to do that.

MS. WILNER: I, I think you may, your Honor. I think

you may need the separate Class for the prospective injunctive relief because.

THE COURT: So, for example, I'll go back to the dairy farmers. You can't do this particular monopsony practice any more and you're not allowed to tie compensation to X, Y and Z any more. You don't need a separate Class for that.

MS. WILNER: Mm-mm. Well, what I would say to that, your Honor, is the, the checkpoints Class and the Tinted Windows Class are seeking damages for two very specific, very tightly bound policies and practices and the reason for that is because looking at the predominance requirement under (b)(3), the Class has to be very unified in that way in order for the common questions to predominant over the individual issues.

But in the (b)(2) universe there is no requirement that common questions predominate over individual issues. All you need is a common question. And the unlawful behavior that the BPD is currently engaged in is broader than checkpoints and tinted windows. It is happening in the same neighborhoods. It's happening to the same people. So, the Class of Black and Latino drivers in Buffalo is still being harmed by racially discriminatory traffic stops, racial profiling, ticketing. And that is why injunctive relief is necessary.

So the common questions that we're looking at for this

11:24AM

11:23AM

11:23AM

11:24AM

11:25AM

11:25AM 25

11:25AM

11:25AM

11:26AM

11:26AM

11:27AM

11:27AM

Traffic Enforcement Class is whether the City today is continuing to engage in racially discriminatory traffic enforcement and, if so, whether the City's deliberate indifference to that ongoing discrimination has caused practices to continue. And we've included in this also injunctive relief for the Checkpoints and Tinted Windows Class.

I suppose if the preference is to handle, you know, those components, you know, as part of the (b)(3) certification, I don't really have an issue with that.

But in terms of the ongoing racial discrimination, we are asking for injunctive relief to correct that harm. And the question of whether discrimination is happening and whether it is a policy or practice of the City of Buffalo, those questions are important common questions that every single Class member has had.

And you had asked about the relevance of the Gennaco Report. The Gennaco Report is really critical evidence of discriminatory intent and ongoing discrimination. So, we have a lot of evidence that we intend to present at trial to establish that racial discrimination in traffic enforcement is a current, ongoing practice.

THE COURT: But you would agree with me that's not a question I reach in Class Certification? So I don't need to find that they're not doing a good job training the officers

11:27AM 1 and they're not doing a good job in responding to complaints.

2 None of that is something that I'm going to be inquiring

3 about right now.

MS. WILNER: No. You are going to just be inquiring about whether that question is common to all of the Class members. And the Gennaco Report supports that it is and it also supports the common nature of the proof that all of the Class members are able to rely on the same body of evidence in order to establish their claims. So that's really the relevance of the report at the Class Certification stage.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. WILNER: In terms of standing, which defendants have challenged, the law in the Second Circuit is that only one named plaintiff needs to have standing in order for the Class Certification to proceed. Now, of course, we believe that all of our named plaintiffs have standing. They're in the same position as each other. They have the same claims as each other.

What the courts have said is that when individual plaintiffs in police discrimination or unconstitutional policing case like this, when they have faced repeated past incidents and that there's also an official policy, or an equivalent, that those two things together create standing for prospective relief.

And we meet that standard, your Honor. All of our named

11:27AM

11:27AM

11:28AM 15

11:28AM

11:28AM

11:28AM

11:29AM

11:29AM

11:30AM

11:30AM

11:30AM

plaintiffs have described at least one incident where they believe they were subjected to racial discriminatory traffic enforcement. Many of them have talked about more than one time when they believe they have suffered discrimination in traffic enforcement from the BPD.

There is compelling evidence that we plan to submit around statistical disparities, around racial animus within the Buffalo Police Department, around the mayor's admissions to the Menino Survey of theirs that BPD officers treat white people somewhat better than black people and that racism on the police force is partially responsible for police violence in Buffalo. So -- and we have a lot of other evidence that's similar.

The really critical piece of the Gennaco Report is that it underscores the City's policymakers' responsibility for this situation. Because discrimination is happening and the City is not correcting it. They are not supervising officers. They are not monitoring. They're investigation process is broken. It is an unbelievable Catch-22 where the commissioners say that the only thing they can do to address discrimination is to adjudicate individual complaints that people file with the Internal Affairs Department but then the Internal Affairs Department's procedures are so lacking and so far beyond any standard, that they're incapable of assessing whether discrimination is occurring.

11:30AM

11:31AM

11:31AM

11:32AM

11:32AM

11:32AM

The City has refused to collect data or look at data that could help to elucidate this. They are not supervising their officers. They're not auditing. They're not — the body camera footage that they agreed that they're not going to look at to see if officers are treating people with respect or treating people in a non-discriminatory manner.

And, so, those 120 pages or whatever it is of the Gennaco Report records in detail all of the ways that the policymakers within the City of Buffalo have failed to do anything -- anything -- to identify and address and correct ongoing racial discrimination. And that gives rise to liability under Monell. And that is also an official policy that provides the basis for standing. I will refer the Court to our briefs but we cited a number of very similar cases where courts have found that they had standing to bring claims for prospective injunctive relief.

And then -- well, let me just stop here. Are there questions remaining in your mind on standing?

THE COURT: There's questions remaining but you helped my questions and you answered with your answers.

MS. WILNER: Thank you.

Then you had also asked about the injunctive relief and although I don't have it handy, so I'm going to refer the Court to the amended complaint. The amended complaint sets out specific relief that we would be asking the Court to

11:32AM

11:33AM

11:33AM

11:33AM

11:34AM

11:34AM

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

order. And the types of relief that we're asking for are 1 types of relief that are very commonly ordered in other 2 cases. So whether it's collecting race data for people who 3 are ticketed and then actually being able to look at that 4 5 data, whether it's improving training for officers, there are some specific things that we've asked for such as not running 6 the checkpoints anymore, and ending the multiple tinted 7 windows ticketing practices. 8 9 But it's really about changing the policies and practices of the Buffalo Police Department so that it is 10

practices of the Buffalo Police Department so that it is possible for the police department to meet its constitutional obligations which is to identify when racial discrimination is occurring and to take the steps that it needs to prevent it. And it's not to say that the City has to -- and I don't think it can -- prevent 100 percent of every incident from ever occurring but the City has to have policies and practices in place to address the situation. It can't just, you know, put its head in the sand and allow discrimination to continue and to say, oh, I didn't, I didn't know about it. I've buried my head in the sand, I've chosen not to look and, therefore, I don't have to do anything, that's not the way the ball works and that's --

THE COURT: The City --

MS. WILNER: -- not what the Constitution demands.

THE COURT: If the City said we are going to stop all

checkpoints except DUI checkpoints and we're going to have a 11:34AM 1 2 policy that if you issue a tinted window violation, you can 3 only issue one, how much of your injunctive relief -- other than general don't violate the Fourth Amendment -- how much 11:34AM 5 of your injunctive relief would go by the wayside? MS. WILNER: I don't think very much, your Honor, 6 because a really important part of this Class is the fact 7 that the Buffalo Police Department is continuing to engage in 8 9 racial profiling with stops and with tickets. And, so, it's 11:35AM 10 extremely important that there be changes to monitoring 11 supervision and discipline of officers to prevent that racial 12 profiling and racially-motivated stops and ticketing from 13 continuing. And that's not relief that really flows from 14 either of the Checkpoints Class or the Tinted Windows Class. 15 It's really broader and it's about practices that are 11:35AM 16 happening now. 17 THE COURT: So --18 MS. WILNER: And prac --19 THE COURT: So getting back to the pragmatic. 11:35AM 20 MS. WILNER: Yeah. 21 THE COURT: And you know that if the Court issues an 22 injunction, it has to be very specific --23 MS. WILNER: Yeah. 24 THE COURT: -- as to who it's directed to and what's 11:36AM necessary and it can't be just comply with the Fourth 25

11:36AM 1 Amendment.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

25

11:36AM

11:36AM

11:36AM

11:37AM

11:37AM

2 MS. WILNER: Right.

THE COURT: And it can't be: Adopt appropriate measures to insure that documentation of all civil traffic stops and vehicle checkpoints is retained.

I mean, it has to be very, very specific.

MS. WILNER: Yeah. So, this is not something that -it's in our briefing but I can tell you that's the main thing
that our organization does is these kinds of civil rights
Class Actions seeking injunctive relief to reform complex
governmental systems so that they comply with the
Constitution and the law.

And so the way that that normally happens there's a couple of paths. One is that we could get to a point where the defendants and we agree that there is a problem and sometimes this doesn't happen until after the liability issues have determined but once -- it's very common that there is then a collaborative process between the parties and the Court to determine the shape of the injunction that's eventually issued.

THE COURT: Well, that's why --

MS. WILNER: I --

THE COURT: -- I asked if they disavow future checkpoints and they say no tinted window tickets beyond one, how much of that takes care of that.

11:37AM

11:37AM

11:38AM

11:38AM

11:38AM

11:39AM

But I'm understanding you to say you're looking for much broader reforms?

MS. WILNER: That's correct. So that really wouldn't -that would not provide adequate relief to our Class but what
the relief would be, there has to be a lot more detailed
conversation about that. So, sometimes the courts will ask
each side to make a detailed proposal. There can be
hearings. There can be presentation of evidence. In the
Floyd case -- which was the New York City stop and frisk
case -- there was a lot of testimony and presentation and a
very detailed injunctive plan that the judge issued after
taking in all the evidence from both sides.

So there's different ways that courts handle this. But you have to be able to hear from both sides because there is information that we have from our clients' experience and there's information that the defendants have from, on their side, from their administrative oversight of policing. And an injunction is only effective when both sides are able to provide that information to the Court and then relief is fashioned to address the specific practices that are causing the harm.

And usually there are also a series of benchmarks or goals that we would meet or expectations that have to be met in order to determine whether the injunctive relief is achieving the goal of ending the constitutional violation.

		BLRR, et al vs. City of Buffalo, et al - 18-CV-719
11.20714	1	So it is a stop by stop process but itle one that sounts do
11:39AM	1	So it is a step-by-step process but it's one that courts do
	2	frequently.
	3	I think I'll conclude and step down, your Honor. Thank
	4	you.
11:39AM	5	THE COURT: All right. Let's start with defendants.
	6	We've got about a little shy of a half hour before noon. I'm
	7	happy to break later if you want but I want to give you equal
	8	opportunity. So however long you want to take, I will be
	9	here.
11:39AM	10	MR. RUSS: Thank you, your Honor.
	11	I don't intend on taking that long unless it's to answer
	12	your questions.
	13	Thank you. And may it please the Court.
	14	Before I get started, I wanted to thank the Court for
11:40AM	15	coming from Vermont, for bringing her staff from Vermont. I
	16	know it's out of the ordinary and we truly appreciate it.
	17	I guess the best we could do for you is to get some
	18	green marble.
	19	THE COURT: That does look like Vermont marble.
11:40AM	20	MR. RUSS: Also, your Honor, congratulations. I
	21	understand that you are now chief.
	22	THE COURT: For the second time, yes.
	23	MR. RUSS: And I'm sorry that I have no PowerPoint. I
	24	have no real excuse other than I'm kind of a dinosaur.

I'm going to go, actually, backwards. I'm more

11:40AM 25

11:40AM

11:41AM

11:41AM

11:42AM

11:42AM

11:42AM

concerned with addressing the Court's musings than I am making a formal argument. So what I will try to do is address some of the musings that you have made and then if there's something left, I'll do a formal argument.

But just before I address the musings, I feel compelled to say two things: Even though we are talking about discriminatory practices and, you know, for purposes of this motion, we are talking about discriminatory practices and discriminatory policies, the City defendants, and in particular the Mayor and the Former Mayor, do not concede discrimination. It's difficult for me to imagine that our Mayor, who just stepped down last week, had been mayor for 19 plus years and is Black and one of the police commissioners involved during the timeframe of this case is Black, and a number of the police officers involved are Black, it's just difficult to conceive that the kind of discriminatory animus that plaintiffs recite existed.

And the other thing I feel compelled to say, your Honor, is that you had asked for some background on the checkpoints and how they operated.

THE COURT: But you would, you would agree with me, women discriminate against women, people over the age of 40 can discriminate against other people over the age of 40. I mean, there isn't any preclusion that just because you are a member of the alleged targeted Class, that categorically you

couldn't be engaged in discrimination?

11:42AM

11:43AM

11:43AM

11:43AM

11:44AM

11:44AM

MR. RUSS: I do concede that, your Honor. However, I state that the way it's been framed in this case is this vast conspiracy and in order for plaintiffs' claims to be believed, all kinds of people were working together to erect the system and carry out this process and it's just, it's not supported by the evidence.

The second thing that the Court should know -- and this is about the checkpoints. You had asked to explain how they worked and how they operated. Well, plaintiffs left out the start. The checkpoints started when the East Side of Buffalo -- which I will stipulate is predominantly Black and has been since the 1940s -- the east side of Buffalo through public meetings, many at churches, others at community centers asked the mayor and the police department for a greater police presence on the East Side.

And the first -- the first and motivating principle of the checkpoints was traffic safety. There were reports that cars were racing through the East Side and bad things were happening with cars and we had to do something about the traffic on the East Side. That was the start of everything. So, I mostly agree with plaintiff's recitation of how the checkpoints operated, at least the factual part, but it started with a request from the community for a greater police presence. Okay.

Your musings. Your first musing was you asked us to discuss summary judgment and how summary judgment might fit into this process.

THE COURT: Do you mind if I stop you --

MR. RUSS: Sure.

11:44AM

11:44AM

11:45AM

11:45AM

11:45AM

11:46AM

THE COURT: -- and go back to -- assume that I, you know, for the sake of argument, that your recitation about how they work and why they were set up works. I'm trying to understand in Fourth Amendment reasonableness terms. So, there's a request for a police presence, you start these checkpoints, the checkpoints, I assume based on what I've read, were for public safety not, not so much people are driving too fast but somebody's going to get killed or to get people who have outstanding warrants, that kind of thing.

Then what's the thought process with the traffic tickets coming out of it? How does that get factored into it?

Because whether somebody has tinted windows or not doesn't have anything to do with how fast they're driving or how recklessly they're driving and it doesn't have anything to do with whether there's an outstanding warrant or there is an unlicensed firearm in the car or the person's a felon or anything else like that. So what's that step about?

MR. RUSS: So, I think you put your finger on it, your Honor, when you were talking about safety. If you just stop people and let everyone go with no consequences, what's the,

what's the deterrent or what's the remedy for the, for the neighborhood? But if in during the stop you find that there are -- you have probable cause, you find that there are violations, and then you issue tickets for those violations, I think that goes to the purpose of stopping the problem traffic.

THE COURT: Okay. I can --

11:46AM

11:46AM

11:46AM

11:47AM

11:47AM

11:47AM

MR. RUSS: In other words if you just stop.

THE COURT: No, I understand the consequent part.

But to me it sounds a fair amount like stop and frisk, where the policy is you're going in, you're going to get stopped and you're going to get frisked. Everybody's going to go in. So it creates an incentive don't come in with a gun, don't come in with drugs because this is going to happen to you every time you go into the City. And I'm not seeing any kind of concession by the City that that's what this is.

And, so, if it's general crime -- or I would say violent crime, then it doesn't seem to make sense to issue the traffic violations and if it's only about traffic enforcement, it seems like overkill in that you would have, you know, a secondary inspection and you would be stopping people on their way to work and to the grocery store and back from school because of an unregistered vehicle or suspended license. And, as I said, it doesn't really seem to make any difference whether somebody's got a registered vehicle in

11:48AM 1 terms of how careful they drive. In fact, they might drive more carefully because they don't want to get stopped and 2 3 have the lack of registration be found. So, that's the step I'm missing in terms of how does 4 11:48AM 5 this make sense in any kind of objection, you know, and I use the example in my musings of there was a shooting on this 6 particular corner last night, let's get a traffic checkpoint 7 there the next day. To do what? To show a police presence? 8 9 Okay, that's one thing. But to garner evidence of that 11:48AM crime, it's probably too late for that. So that's where I'm 10 11 stopped. 12 MR. RUSS: Yeah, I think you said Broadway and 13 somewhere. 14 THE COURT: Fillmore or something. 11:48AM 15 MR. RUSS: Let me try three answers to that because I 16 can never do just one. First one, it is not a stop and frisk 17 or it's not like a stop and frisk because not everyone is 18 detained. 19 THE COURT: Well they're all initially detained. 11:49AM MR. RUSS: They're all stopped. 20

21 **THE COURT:** Right.

22

23

24

25

11:49AM

MR. RUSS: But it could be two seconds and they're going.

THE COURT: But we would agree that that stop is a detention. Whether it violates the Fourth Amendment or not,

11:49AM 1 it's a seizure.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

11:49AM

11:49AM

11:50AM

11:50AM

11:50AM

MR. RUSS: I agree that the stop is a detention. I don't think it's a stop and frisk because it's not applied to everyone single person no matter what.

THE COURT: Well let me ask: Everybody going through that checkpoint has to stop. So it's not like a -- it's not even like a DUI checkpoint where they're like we're going to stop every fourth car, everybody gets stopped, correct?

MR. RUSS: Yes, your Honor. But some get waved right through so that the stop is a matter of seconds.

The second thing I was going to say, your Honor, is that your own description of the deterrence was, oh, I'm going to get stopped and I'm going to get a ticket for such and such and so and so. That's the deterrence.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUSS: Even you --

17 **THE COURT:** Okay.

MR. RUSS: Even you said that.

And the third -- I'm getting old. I can't remember. If it comes back to me, I'll say it. But...

THE COURT: Well I was asking about how would it help after a crime. Does that prompt you?

MR. RUSS: Oh, you did ask that. And what I was going to say -- and I'm not exactly articulate on this, I understand, but because checkpoints may be inartfully set up

or set up in sort of some, perhaps, questionable locations, that doesn't mean they're set up for discriminatory purposes and it doesn't mean that because they are set up in certain places, that, you know, automatically there's this violation of the Fourth Amendment.

THE COURT: Agreed.

MR. RUSS: Bad judgment is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, I don't think.

You had asked about summary judgment and how does it fit in. I understand that Class Actions are complicated and motion heavy. But I just don't see summary judgment here at all on anything, even the most basic issue were our practices discriminatory? We're going to say no, they're going to say yes. That's a question of fact. And that's before you get to any individual concerns. And I just, I just -- I don't know how.

THE COURT: Well, there's a robust body of law on the Fourth Amendment as to when you can stop people and when you cannot. And if there isn't a special need and, you know, the best example is the DUI checkpoints which are generally, if they're handled well, are deemed constitutional. I'll be looking at other checkpoints. I mean, the border's kind of not a good example because of the heightened ability of law enforcement near the proximity of the border. But there's plenty of cases about doing that too far from the border and

11:51AM

11:50AM

11:51AM 10

11:51AM

11:52AM

11:52AM

11:52AM	1	what happens to the analysis under the Fourth Amendment if
	2	you're not in close proximity to the border. But you're in
	3	Montpelier, Vermont and you're checking cars to see if
	4	somebody is in the country without status. So it's not like
11:52AM	5	it couldn't be resolved on summary judgment.
	6	MR. RUSS: I agree with you in theory, your Honor. And
	7	if this were, you know, one checkpoint or one week or one set
	8	of checkpoints, then maybe that you can determine whether
	9	that would violate the Fourth Amendment. But you have
11:53AM	10	hundreds here. And then within those checkpoints, you have
	11	potentially hundreds of stops. So I just
	12	THE COURT: But maybe if I could resolve nothing on
	13	summary judgment, so be it. Do you think that that's kind of
	14	a pivot point for Class Certification?
11:53AM	15	MR. RUSS: The Fourth Amendment claims?
	16	THE COURT: No. I mean, whether I can I wanted you
	17	to be pragmatic and you're being pragmatic for me by saying
	18	you're right, this is not something we can just do on summary
	19	judgment, we're going to have to have a trial and that's
11:54AM	20	fine. But that's not much of a pivot point for Class
	21	Certification or not, would you agree with me?
	22	MR. RUSS: I would agree with you but I was endeavoring
	23	to answer the Court's first question, first musing.
	24	THE COURT: Okay. So you think this is not a case in

11:54AM 25

which --

11:54AM 1 **MR. RUSS:** No.

11:54AM

11:54AM

11:55AM

11:55AM

11:55AM

THE COURT: -- we can do it?

3 MR. RUSS: No.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUSS: And I'll go further, your Honor. I've had Class actions where -- that I've defended where we -- and maybe your dairy farmer one was like this -- where you can kind of whittle things down but I just don't see that here.

You mused about general damages. There may be some questions of general damages here but it's virtually all individual. And the most obvious element or the most obvious example of that is, okay, each of these claimants states that my Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Well, how does that affect that person? What did that cause? How did they feel? Did they have job consequences? Did they have financial consequences? All that, all those individual kind of questions -- which I'll talk more about -- I think so far outweigh any notion of general damages.

The second thing I would say, your Honor --

THE COURT: Well, let me stop you on that point. Do you agree -- and the plaintiffs didn't so you don't have to worry about it -- they could do away with all of that, they could say all we're seeking is general damages and we weren't looking for any individualized harm recovery other than this economic component which they say we can easily determine

because we've got the records of how many tickets and who they went to and how much they paid and what the impound fees were, they could do away with the whole question of how in particular was your Fourth Amendment violation for you?

MR. RUSS: I agree with that, your Honor, but I don't see that coming.

THE COURT: It's not coming to.

11:55AM

11:56AM

11:56AM

11:56AM

11:57AM

11:57AM

MR. RUSS: And I think -- I'm sorry to refer to your dairy farmer case -- but you had mentioned, you had started to describe damages on that based on the weight of the milk and the volume, whatever. You know, that's a case where there's a formula. And at least as it's pled now, there's no formula. Everything's individual.

You had asked about the Traffic Enforcement Class and I know you asked counsel a bunch of questions and I don't necessarily want to repeat those. But what I'd like to add, your Honor is a couple things.

You did note that the City has stopped doing these checkpoints and the current Commissioner of Police, Joseph Gramaglia testified under oath that they're stopped, there's no future intent to do them.

But I feel -- this is maybe a little obnoxious and I apologize -- but I feel as if plaintiffs don't really know what they want. And I feel, I feel like it's, you know, Donald Trump being asked what he's going to do and he says,

11:57AM 1 well, I have a concept of a plan. That means you don't have 2 a plan. And I don't think that they know. What is the 3 injunctive relief? Don't violate the law? You know, don't violate the Fourth Amendment? I just -- I don't see it. 4 11:57AM 5 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you about the Traffic Enforcement Class, obviously the one the Court has the 6 biggest problem with, and especially the injunctive relief 7 8 component. And there is a body of law that's recent from the 9 Second Circuit that talks about you can't just say, well, 11:58AM 10 Commissioner Jane says she's not going to have -- she's got 11 no plans for another checkpoint and that's enough to take 12 care of the injury because somebody else can say I'd, you 13 know, change that policy in a heartbeat. And we just had a 14 case challenging a facial challenge to a statute in Vermont 15 about harassment by electronic means where somebody was 11:58AM 16 posting, tagging somebody as a racist and there's apparently 17 a group that then attack the business and whether that was a 18 violation. And I found standing because even though the 19 Attorney General was like we're not going to do this and we 11:58AM 20 don't enforce these, it had happened once and there's no 21 quarantee that it won't. But people do disavow: We're not 22 going to do this again. And we, you know, a City Council can 23 do that. 24 And that's not happening in this case, either. So I'm

not hearing there will be no more checkpoints. There will be

11:59AM

25

no more than one ticket for tinted windows. So those are all 11:59AM 1 things that are concrete and it's not a statement like don't 2 3 violate the Fourth Amendment. I mean, I could order those things, if the proof merited it. 11:59AM 5 MR. RUSS: I definitely think that you could order those things. And I hesitate to say this but I think some of that 6 relief, we'd probably stipulate to. 7 THE COURT: I agree. And I raise that because those are 8

kind of things that -- that's why I asked Ms. Wilner if those two components, how much would be left of injunctive relief and she had, you know, good answers but, yes, that is what happens in some of these cases, without an admission of liability, this isn't going to happen and that's not going to happen.

MR. RUSS: Right. So --

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

12:00PM

12:00PM

12:00PM

12:00PM

THE COURT: That's kind of beyond what we have to do for Class Certification.

MR. RUSS: That's all right, your Honor. It's, it's more fun than talking to a wall, so no worry.

Other things about the injunctive relief Traffic

Enforcement Class. I told you the practice has stopped but
what happens if you enter an injunction and it's violated,
does the Court have to enforce everything, does the Court
have to address every claimed violation of the injunction?

Does the Court have to involve itself in the operations of

the Buffalo Police Department?

12:01PM

12:01PM

12:01PM

12:02PM

12:02PM

12:03PM

I'm not sure that it's something that the Court would want to do, let alone be equipped to do and a concrete specific injunction about one practice, you know, that's easily monitored but this kind of nebulous amorphous concept of a plan, practice, I don't know how the Court deals with that and I don't know that the Court wants to deal with that.

You asked some questions and there was some discussion of the plaintiffs' expert report, Gennaco Report. And what I wanted to add to the discussion, your Honor, is that that 120 something page report talks about ideal practices and best practices and what certain police departments do and should do and what the Buffalo Police Department does and should do.

And I would just say, your Honor, that I don't think it has any relevance to this motion right now, first of all.

And, second of all, if it does, the fact that the Buffalo Police Department may not use best practices does not equal constitutional violations. So, that they could improve their practices doesn't give rise for some kind of finding of discrimination and result in an injunction.

THE COURT: I think the answer was -- and it was a good one -- is that all of the Class members could use the same expert and whether it would be admissible in this particular case is a whole different issue but they wouldn't need to go out and get their own experts because they would use this

report.

12:03PM

12:03PM

12:03PM

12:04PM

12:04PM

12:05PM

MR. RUSS: I'm not going to concede that, your Honor. But let's say that, that was the process. Don't you have to evaluate whether the challenged practices went into the setting up of every checkpoint and each officer's disposition on a certain night in a certain neighborhood, you know, went into the kind of was not a best practices thing, was not a discriminatory? I mean, I understand that the report is probably helpful to kind of tell the background and to show that the police department does have problems. But I don't know how it translates into each individual Class member's claim.

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. RUSS: We spent a lot of time talking about the Checkpoint Class and the Tinted Windows Class and the point I want to make, your Honor, and the point I would have tried to make if I had given you a straightforward formal argument is that while there may be some common questions, there are unlimited individual questions on both sides, both on the liability side and on the damages side. And the damages you spent a lot of time talking about and I don't need to go through all of that, I don't think.

But just the point that I made about, you know, a violation of the Fourth Amendment, how did that affect that individual person? What happened to that person because of

12:05PM 1 it? That's an individual -- that's an individual analysis. There's no way you can do that on a common basis. 2 3 THE COURT: Well, they can, they can do that. They can say for each Fourth Amendment violation, we are seeking a 4 12:05PM 5 allegedly nominal sum of damages of \$100 per Class member. They can do that. That's one way. And then they say, you 6 know, don't worry about that because we're going to stop our 7 damages after that secondary detention. So, if you were 8 9 going to base it on the first detention which we're saying is 12:05PM 10 unconstitutional, the secondary detention unconstitutional, 11 we weren't going to take up whether you get arrested, you get 12 strip searched, whether you're detained for three hours 13 later, whether there's probable cause, whether there's no 14 probable cause, that's all not going to be part of our case. 15 12:06PM And they can carve out their case that way and arguably they 16 probably would make their case easier if they carved out 17 individual damages, period, that way. But that's why I 18 started with they're the masters of their complaint and they 19 can decide how to plead it. 12:06PM 20 MR. RUSS: That's not how it's pled. 21 THE COURT: I agree. 22 MR. RUSS: And as the defendant, I have to address how 23 it's pled. And the pleadings seek those kind of damages 24 which are individual damages. 12:06PM 25 Maybe some aspect of it could be the dairy farmer

12:06PM 1 formula like we were stopped once, then we were stopped twice, you know, that's a hundred dollars. But if you start 2 3 getting into how long were you stopped the first time, how long were you stopped the second time, what happened, that's 4 just all individual. And I, I don't know how we do that with 12:07PM 5 the thousands and thousands and thousands of plaintiffs here 6 considered. 7 THE COURT: It's after noon now. And, like I said, 8 9 we're here all day and we tried to get an earlier flight 12:07PM based on your time period. We didn't get one so we can go 10 11 all day. 12 Would you like to break for lunch and come back because 13 we're going to have a little bit of time for rebuttal so it 14 seems like it might not be a bad idea. MR. RUSS: I want to make the court happy. So if that 12:07PM 15 16 is what makes the court happy, I'm happy. 17 THE COURT: We do have court staff. I could continue 18 but I want to give them a break, as well. Why don't we come back at five after 1 for resumption, and does that work for 19 12:07PM everybody? 20 21 MR. RUSS: Yes, your Honor, thank you. 22 (WHEREUPON, luncheon recess taken.) 23 (Open court:) 24 THE COURT: We are back on the record in Black Love

Resists in the Rust, et al. v. the City of Buffalo.

1:14PM

25

		Direct, ce ar vo. crey or barrare, ce ar re ev /13
1:14PM	1	Reminder to the people on YouTube, that we do not allow
	2	any recording.
	3	And we are in the defendant's argument.
	4	And you may resume.
1:15PM	5	MR. RUSS: Thank you, your Honor.
	6	And for the people out there in hyperspace, I'm Hugh
	7	Russ representing the defendants.
	8	And I'm close to finishing, your Honor. I did want to
	9	make a few more points. Before I do, I, again, want to thank
1:15PM	10	the Court for coming to Buffalo and bringing its staff to
	11	Buffalo. This really has been helpful, so thank you.
	12	I wanted to say a couple more things about damages.
	13	Counsel made the point that the plaintiffs' Monell claims
	14	could be a general question for the entire Class or Classes.
1:15PM	15	And I think that's probably right whether the City had a
	16	policy, custom or procedure that applied, I think is a
	17	general question. But whether it applied in each
	18	circumstance and that's you know, the police officers at
	19	issue were acting out of some general policy or procedure
1:16PM	20	is an individual question that has to be addressed at every
	21	single stop.

The Court asked some questions and counsel made some argument concerning whether there was financial motive to issue the tickets and while there have been documents and other evidence seeming to suggest that the City was trying to

1:16PM

1:16PM	1	raise revenue through the issuance of more and more traffic
	2	tickets, all of the individual officers who testified during
	3	depositions said that that was not their motive, that
	4	overtime wasn't their motive, that the number of tickets
1:17PM	5	wasn't their motive, that they were just doing their job.
	6	So
	7	THE COURT: But, but that's self-serving testimony
	8	can be admissible. There are documents that talk about
	9	overtime incentives and the desire to have maximum
1:17PM	10	enforcement of the traffic laws and you need to be issuing
	11	those tickets and I think one of the phrases "we're looking
	12	for production". So, that will be a question of fact.
	13	My concern was much more specific. It's one thing to
	14	say in the checkpoints, these officers were allegedly
1:18PM	15	motivated by amping up their production to get overtime.
	16	It's another thing to say in the entire City of Buffalo, all
	17	the time for every reason, these people were stopping
	18	individuals and violating their rights in order to garner
	19	more overtime and rise up in their career. And the
1:18PM	20	conversation was about, well, almost every police department
	21	probably recognizes productivity and, you know, I mean, how
	22	would that be a claim that would be proveable and that's more
	23	of a question for a motion to dismiss but that was what I was
	24	concerned about. Any thoughts about that?

MR. RUSS: As usual, your Honor, you have phrased it

1:18PM

25

better than I have. But I think that's the exact concern. 1:18PM 1 And the attendant concern is -- related concern is 2 3 complimented by the point that the City changed its system of 4 traffic tickets from a state-based system to a City-based 1:19PM 5 system so that it could keep the revenues. Every City, town, village in New York does that or did that and the City was 6 7 actually very late in doing that. So, yes, it is evidence of 8 something but I don't think it's evidence of the Fourth

Amendment violation that plaintiffs believe.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

25

1:19PM

1:19PM

1:20PM

1:20PM

I was listening to counsel's argument about damages and what damages they were seeking and what damages they weren't seeking and at one point I heard, oh, only general damages but then I heard also individual damages and I don't think they know, first of all, but, second of all, as soon as you go into individual damages, you have individual questions that make a Class inappropriate.

I wanted to call the Court's attention to one case in our brief: Townes. And that stands for the proposition that even if there is an unConstitutional stop, if the discipline meted out, that is the tickets, are valid and reasonable and lawful, then you can't recover damages for the ticket and the attending damages, you can only recover for the unconstitutional stop and so that's going to have to be applied to every, every individual claim and, again, that frustrates the Class treatment.

1:21PM	1	THE COURT: Do you think, though, that that shifts if
	2	the claim is limited to any time there's more than two
	3	tickets or two tickets and more for tinted windows? Because
	4	I think the argument is, you never need to do more than one.
1:21PM	5	It's unlikely that a driver has a tinted windshield and
	6	nothing else. So, it's likely the whole car's tinted because
	7	that's the whole purpose. So you can kind of assume that one
	8	ticket would serve the whole car. And then you don't really
	9	have to get into whether it should have been issued or it
1:21PM	10	shouldn't have been issued because you're talking about the
	11	number as opposed to whether it was valid.
	12	MR. RUSS: I understand that concern, your Honor. I
	13	would call the Court's attention to another case in our
	14	brief. It's Torres. And that involved, rather than moving
1:22PM	15	violations, that involved parking violations. And the Court
	16	basically held that multiple parking violations within a
	17	relatively short time period were permissible and, you know,
	18	I think it's the same, same idea here. Is issuing multiple
	19	tinted windows the best judgment? Or the best use of police
1:22PM	20	time? Probably not. But it is permissible and
	21	THE COURT: Well, it's certainly permissible but I think
	22	that their argument is different than that. They're saying
	23	the stop was unlawful, unconstitutional. The secondary
	24	inspection: Unconstitutional, unlawful. And anything that
1:22PM	25	flows from it is the fruit of the poisonous tree but we're

1:23PM	1	going to limit our claims to two tickets for tinting because
	2	one ticket would suffice and we can show that black and
	3	Latino drivers caught the two tickets and more and the white
	4	drivers were, you know, given one ticket. So even if that
1:23PM	5	was permissible, that would still be discriminatory and it
	6	wouldn't be okay just because you can do it.
	7	I mean, there's lots of things you can do, like if you
	8	strip search every female who goes to a jail, even if you
	9	have the right to strip search visitors to the jail but
1:23PM	10	you're singling out the females, you could still have a
	11	constitutional claim. So I think that they're narrowing that
	12	down fairly finally in terms of trying to target what is
	13	unconstitutional and what flows from it.
	14	Why isn't that if the first stop and the second stop
1:24PM	15	are unConstitutional for sake of argument, why wouldn't it be
	16	the fruit of the poisonous tree?
	17	MR. RUSS: First of all, your Honor, the Townes case
	18	that I mentioned talks in that language. So I would
	19	encourage the Court to read it. And the Court says no,
1:24PM	20	that's not the fruit of the poisonous tree.
	21	Secondly, your Honor
	22	THE COURT: So I read Townes but remind me: They found

no Fourth Amendment violation or they found a Fourth

Amendment violation and they said you can't recover for the

consequences of it. You can recover for the violation but if

1:24PM

1:24PM 1 the ticket that results or the arrest that results is valid,
2 no recovery for that. Isn't that how it came out?

MR. RUSS: That's exactly how it came out.

THE COURT: Okay.

1:24PM

1:25PM

1:25PM

1:26PM

1:26PM

MR. RUSS: The second thing I would say, your Honor, is that in the example you mentioned of the strip searching of women, that's a situation — or I hear that's a situation where every single woman is stopped and strip searched, that there's no discretion involved, some get passed through the system without it, others don't. And I think the tinted windows situation, it just would require more individual questions. Why were you — why did you issue four or why did you issue three or why did you issue two? And the circumstances of that depend on each situation. And, again, I don't know how you do that on a Class basis.

THE COURT: I think you could possibly do it on the checkpoints. I'm not persuaded you could do it elsewhere.

MR. RUSS: I would think that -- and I'm sorry I keep referring back to your dairy farmer Class action idea -- but if, if the Checkpoint Class were limited to, you know, some similar question, were you stopped or not and then the damages from that might be, you know, \$25 per tinted window or something like that, some, some formula, then I could see a Class limited like that. But to have to evaluate everything that happens and that happened and why it happened

1:26PM 1 and who did what and how people felt, that's just not right.

1:27PM

1:27PM

1:27PM

1:27PM

1:28PM

THE COURT: Well, they're -- plaintiffs are telling the Court: We're not going to do that. We're going to stop at that secondary stop and so we're going to prove the first stop was unconstitutional. The second detention unreasonably prolonged a unconstitutional stop and that's it. We're not going to get into whether the arrest was good or not. We're not going to be seeking to recover for that. Because I asked the same question you're asking: Isn't it a different injury if you're arrested without probable cause versus there's an arrest warrant, it's valid and that's why you're taken into custody and they said we're not going to be doing any of that.

So if they limit it that way to the first and the second stop, why wouldn't that be a common question that wouldn't require any kind of individualized inquiry? Because according to them -- and I think there's a concession -- everybody's stopped. Everybody that goes through the checkpoint is stopped. It's not like a DUI checkpoint where there's a preexisting we're going to stop every fourth car. It's everybody.

MR. RUSS: Just on that, your Honor, I think some people were waved through so I don't think everyone was stopped.

And when you were asking questions about, well, how do you identify people that didn't get the tinted windows -- that

1:28PM 1 | were stopped but didn't get the tinted windows?

1:28PM

1:28PM

1:29PM

1:29PM

1:30PM

THE COURT: So you think that there was no -- that some people didn't even have to brake, they were just waved through.

MR. RUSS: Well, they had to slow down and come through slowly but, yes, certainly some were just waved through (indicating). I had a brilliant answer for you and I lost it. I apologize.

So, that's a long way of saying, your Honor, that on the damages Classes, there are just way too many individual questions. There may be some common questions but the predominance is not common questions. The predominance is decidedly individual questions.

I wanted to just mention a couple more things. Counsel mentioned something like only 1 percent of the cases are seeking individual damages and that the, that's the tail wagging the dog. They still require work and, you know, if they're thousands and thousands and thousands of people, that means that thousands and thousands and thousands of discovery demands, maybe depositions. So, just because it may be a minor part of the damages claimed, you know, does not eliminate the work involved in getting this case ready.

I know the Court has asked good questions, frankly, and I've done my best to answer them but if there's anything else that you need at this point, I'm happy to try.

1:30PM	1	THE COURT: Nope, thank you. You did a nice job.
	2	MR. RUSS: Thank you, your Honor.
	3	THE COURT: Any rebuttal argument?
	4	MR. WILNER: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.
1:30PM	5	So I'd like to start with clarifying some of the points
	6	that were raised just in this last discussion and then I have
	7	a few more points I'd like to address after that that go back
	8	to the conversation that was happening before the break.
	9	So and I'll start with the applicability of the
1:31PM	10	Townes case which you were just discussing. Townes does not
	11	create a need for individual determinations in this case.
	12	Townes is a Fourth Amendment case and it applies only to
	13	Fourth Amendment violations and as your Honor observed and
	14	I'm just making very clear, we are not seeking damages for
1:31PM	15	tickets and arrests. We're really not seeking damages for
	16	arrests at all but tickets under the Fourth Amendment.
	17	Townes does not apply to the Equal Protection Clause and
	18	we know that has to be true because the Supreme Court has
	19	held that racial discrimination is actionable regardless of
1:32PM	20	whether the stop is supported by probable cause.
	21	And, lastly, just in terms of the facts of Townes,
	22	Townes held that un that damages for unlawful detention
	23	are available under the Fourth Amendment. In that particular
	24	case, Mr. Townes didn't seek damages for unlawful detention.
1:32PM	25	All of the damages that he was seeking were for the

1:32PM

1:32PM

1:33PM

1:33PM

1:34PM

1:34PM

imprisonment that happened after he was charged and then he was tried, he was in jail for a long time. The conviction was eventually reversed because the -- I think there was a bad stop and search at the beginning of it. So the Court held that there was an intervening causation factor that prevented him from being able to recover for those damages that occurred after the prosecution and punishment for those charges. But the Court absolutely held that damages would be available for the unlawful detention prior to the intervening act of the prosecutor and the judge.

And that's what we're seeking in this case: That unlawful detention window. So there is no need to get into individualized questions of probable cause for that.

The other case that counsel just brought up, the *Torres* case, that was a case about procedural due process violations with parking tickets. And we haven't raised a procedural due process claim in this case. *Torres* does not speak to whether multiple ticketing can violate the Equal Protection Clause and, clearly, if multiple ticketing is motivated by racial animus, it can violate the Equal Protection Clause.

I think this takes me into the issue of the Tinted Windows Class and your Honor had expressed some doubt about whether perhaps there was sufficient commonality or whether it would be necessary to look into officer level motivations for the tint -- for the Equal Protection Claims. And, again,

1:34PM

1:35PM

1:35PM

1:35PM

1:36PM

1:36PM

our primary claim for Class purposes is that the

Commissioners who were setting the policy were acting with a racial motivation. And that that setting of policy allowing the discriminatory tinted windows ticketing to continue when they knew all about the practice, allowing it to go forward, that that harmed our Class members, and our Class members can recover for that harm.

And it's not important to decide for that, for that issue whether or not, in addition, there was a separate and additional violation of the Equal Protection Clause by the officer who issued the ticket. If a racially discriminatory policy is harming all members of the Class, then all members of the Class are entitled to recover for that harm.

THE COURT: But the proof of the harm, so the evidence that's going to answer that, as the Wal-Mart case talks about evidence that's going to answer questions, where is that evidence going to come from and how is it going to be kind of processed on a Class certification basis? So, never mind the checkpoints because you are not confining it to the checkpoints, where is that common proof coming from?

MR. WILNER: Yeah. Well, Arlington Heights sets out a mosaic of factors that are used to decide discriminatory intent. A really important aspect of the Arlington Heights standard is statistical disparities so that's one piece of evidence that we're going to be relying on and the

statistical disparities in terms of multiple tinted windows tickets are really stark. The practices were ubiquitous so they were practices that were known to everybody in the Buffalo Police Department and the Commissioners all testified that they knew about them. There is other evidence that we plan to introduce under Arlington Heights that goes to racial animus within the Buffalo Police Department, the historical context, all of those factors. So this is common evidence that will get to the question of whether there was a discriminatory intent on behalf of the Monell policymaker. And if the jury agrees with us that there was such an intent, then the City is going to be liable for the harm that flowed from the discriminatory policy.

THE COURT: Okay.

1:36PM

1:36PM

1:37PM

1:37PM

1:38PM

1:38PM

MR. WILNER: I wanted to also briefly address the issue about being waved through checkpoints and want to state unequivocally that that first passing through a checkpoint is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. I don't think there's any "waved-through" at the checkpoints because everybody who was waved through was still subject to a visual inspection for details that could be observed at common view that wouldn't be observable if they weren't slowed down to either a stop or an extremely slow roll. As well, none of the Class members, none of the people passing through the checkpoints being subject to that initial inspection were

1:38PM

1:38PM

1:39PM

1:39PM

1:39PM

1:40PM

free to leave. In fact, the policy specifically required
that police should chase down and stop anybody who seemed
like they were trying to evade a checkpoint. So it's very
clear that even that first passing through the checkpoint was
a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.

THE COURT: So the secondary checkpoint, not an issue.

Are there cases that say wave-through is a seizure?

MR. WILNER: I would have to look and see if there's specific cases, your Honor, but the general Fourth Amendment standard for a seizure is going to turn on whether the person would been free to leave the police encounter and there -- people were not free to leave. They absolutely were subject to that stop and that was, it was a stop that was made entirely without any kind of individualized suspicion. It was dragnet policing in black and Latino communities.

But if that's a point that would be helpful to have more commentary on it, we can look and see if there are cases that specifically look at that first pass and provide it after the argument.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not aware of any case that says a wave-through is a stop. But I'm also not aware of anything that says if you have to go through the checkpoint to get to your home or to get into a neighborhood or go to the grocery store and instead of coming to a full stop, you're allowed to slowly roll through it, that's not a seizure because we want

1:40PM 1 those brakes on, that seems kind of a crazy standard, so.

1:40PM

1:40PM

1:41PM

1:41PM

1:41PM

MR. WILNER: Okay. I'll leave it there, your Honor.

I'd like to address some of the points regarding damages and I don't think that we've talked a lot about how general damages would be determined. I'm not sure if that's a question that the Court may have concerns about. But we've cited a number of cases in our materials in which general damages were awarded in Class Actions. The jury has determined the amount of the general damages but it is essentially a trial by formula.

So how we would see this working, for example, for the unlawful detentions is that the jury would determine the dollar value of the length of time of the detention and then that formula would be applied to every Class member who passes through the checkpoint. And there really isn't a lot of authority or examples out there to apply general damages to an Equal Protection violation. But the principle is the same: That it would be up to the jury to determine uniform amount to apply that is tied to the inherent harms of the constitutional violation and that is the amount that every Class member would get.

THE COURT: So I think our focus was not so much on what the jury would do, although that's a good point, because the jury's going to do what you ask it to do or the Court asks it to do. And at this point, from plaintiffs' standpoint, there

1:42PM

1:42PM

1:42PM

1:43PM

1:43PM

1:44PM

isn't any kind of formula, or at least I didn't see one
proposed, of this is how we're going to do it. And that's
when I asked, you know, pragmatically what are you going to
be seeking and how would that happen and what would it look
like? And I suggested to opposing counsel you could say \$100
for every stop. You're suggesting you would potentially tie
some monetary amount to the duration of the stop.

MR. WILNER: Correct. And we did in our opening brief in the section of the brief that discusses manageability, there is some discussion of how -- and actually I believe we covered it in our reply brief, as well. So we have offered some examples of how courts have administered general damages in Class actions in other cases. The question of individual damages, again, we believe that the primary individual damages in this case are the economic harms that are already known and stored in City records and where those damages are very easily administered.

THE COURT: But this is where I really think the defendants have some traction. You could say the tip of iceberg. You can say it's a small fraction of what we're doing. But in terms of court time and the need for evidentiary hearings and whether it fits into Rule 23 and is going to be effective, that's where it doesn't matter if it's, you know, a request for \$25. If we're going to have a jury trial on it, that's going to be where it breaks down.

So that's the concern is not that it's just a small 1:44PM 1 2 fragment of what you're requesting, it's the time constraints 3 in that fragment and whether it makes sense if we, I mean, what are we going to have an evidentiary hearing for 6,000, 4 1:44PM 5 10,000 people? I mean, that would be unmanageable. 6 MR. WILNER: I agree that that could potentially be unmanageable but that's not a reason to deny Class 7 8 Certification now. So, for starters, if we look at the --9 THE COURT: But their point is -- and I agree you've got 1:44PM 10 the better point -- their point is that takes predominance 11 out. So if you're talking about 10,000 evidentiary hearings 12 on individual damages and I look at the common, you know, the 13 commonality and the predominance and what can I get resolved 14 as a Class, their argument is this pie is way bigger and so 1:45PM 15 this isn't a Class Action suit. You're not going to be able 16 to achieve much by proceeding as a Class. 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1:45PM

1:45PM

I agree with you that courts often do it this way anyways because at least it's easier to manage some parts of the case but that's the concern.

MR. WILNER: Yeah. And I, I absolutely understand the concern. I mean -- the Betances case I think we just submitted in a supplemental briefing, I think the Court in that case was very thoughtful about the different kinds of damages and how they were handled. The Court in that case absolutely said that it was always appropriate to certify the

1:45PM 1 Class at least for the liability phase and *In re Nassau*2 *County Strip Search Cases* says the same thing because in

3 liability, all of the issues are common. So at least for

4 liability Class certification, it's definitely appropriate.

1:46PM

1:46PM

1:46PM

1:47PM

1:47PM

In Betances, the Court then went on to also look at how it could administer at least those parts of damages that were common and were general. I proposed to the Court because Class certification is flexible and the court always retains a lot of control over how to manage the proceedings and, for that matter, defendants can move to decertify a Class at any time. And in Betances, I think they moved four times to decertify the Class as the Class moved along.

The most efficient thing to do is to certify the Class based on the overall predominance of the liability and the fact that most damages questions are common, to adjudicate the common questions which includes liability and the common damages, and then at that point we'll know a lot more about whether there even are individual damages claims. At this point they don't even know if they will materialize. But if they do materialize, we'll have a much better idea of how significant they are, how many people are bringing them on, and then can decide what to do. And it may be at that point that the Class needs to be decertified, if there is an unmanageable number of individual Classes.

But if you're looking at this from a superiority

1:47PM 1 perspective, those Class members are so much better off 2 having liability determined which would be probably 3 impossible for them to do on their own without us to represent them in that trial, having their general damages 4 1:47PM 5 determined, having their economic harms determined. leaves a small amount for them to handle on their own as 6 7 opposed to just abandoning them to have no recourse for those claims. 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

25

1:48PM

1:48PM

1:48PM

1:49PM

That said, I do want to say I can't stand up here today and disclaim those damages because I would need to have conversations with our clients. But if the Court feels that this issue really would be an impediment to certification, we certainly would like the opportunity to discuss it with our clients and, you know, reconsider the position that's been taken here today.

THE COURT: So I'm not an interventionalist judge and don't get involved. I point out -- like if you discontinue the practice of issuing two tickets for tinted windows some of the injunctive relief goes out the window. It's nothing you can't see for yourself. You decide what you want to do. I've expressed my concerns about that portion of the case.

MR. WILNER: Okay. Thank you very much.

I'd like to go back to the traffic enforcement Class and answer, I think a few doubts that I heard from the Court on that Class. And I'd like to stop -- or, actually, start with

the Class definition. And this is not a boundless Class. 1:49PM 1 2 This is a Class comprised of people who have been or will be 3 subjected to traffic stops, traffic tickets and traffic safety vehicle checkpoints. 4 1:49PM 5 THE COURT: Think about it this way. I've got to issue a notice -- and you'll be helping me draft it, along with the 6 defendant if I grant Class certification -- who is that 7 8 notice going to. 9 MR. WILNER: Yeah. So for the (b)(2) certification, 1:49PM 10 there is no requirement for individualized notice. 11 THE COURT: But still who's it going to? It's going to 12 be in the newspaper --13 MR. WILNER: Yes. 14 THE COURT: -- and it's going to say if you are black or 1:50PM 15 Latino and you plan to drive -- and you have driven in 16 Buffalo or you plan to drive in Buffalo, you may be a Class 17 member? 18 MR. WILNER: The way we usually handle notice for (b) (2) 19 Class actions is notice by publication, as well as usually 1:50PM 20 we'll provide notice to places that are likely to have a 21 proof of contact with Class members so that they can provide 22 notice. So, for example, the Legal Aid Society that's often

representing defendants in tickets, legal, other legal services programs, community organizations that are in the community. So we would provide notice --

1:50PM	1	THE COURT: I'm not
	2	MR. WILNER: That
	3	THE COURT: so concerned with where.
	4	MR. WILNER: Yes.
1:50PM	5	THE COURT: Would it say: If you're black or Latino
	6	I'm looking at your
	7	MR. WILNER: Yes.
	8	THE COURT: definition, that's what it would say?
	9	MR. WILNER: Yes. The notice would provide the Class
1:51PM	10	definition as well as to me it makes sense because the (b)(3)
	11	Class members would be each entitled to an individual notice
	12	of the certification of the damages Classes and so it would
	13	make sense to me to also include specific individual notice
	14	to them. They would also be members of the traffic
1:51PM	15	enforcement Class. So they would it's not required under
	16	the rules but it would be no extra cost to provide a
	17	specific
	18	THE COURT: And would you agree with me that the Class
	19	would then include any black or Latino individual who either
1:51PM	20	drives currently or may want to drive in the future in
	21	Buffalo?
	22	MR. WILNER: No, that would be an overbroad look at the
	23	Class definition. The Class definition is limited to people
	24	who are actually subjected to traffic stops, traffic tickets,
1:51PM	25	and traffic safety vehicle checkpoints.

THE COURT: Or will be. 1:51PM 1 2 MR. WILNER: The --3 THE COURT: Or will be. MR. WILNER: Or will be. But they don't become a member 4 1:52PM 5 of the Class until they actually experience the traffic enforcement. It's a little weird but that's the way that 6 courts normally think about it. So it's in determinant in 7 8 the sense that the Class contains future members whose 9 identity is not known now but when they become subject to the particular defined activity, they are known. And a traffic 1:52PM 10 11 stop, a traffic ticket, these are things that the City of 12 Buffalo has records of. So there isn't ever really a 13 question about who is and isn't a member of the Class. And 14 then, furthermore, all the relief is directed at the 1:52PM 15 defendants, it's directing them to change their practices. 16 THE COURT: So if it was retrospected, it's 17 ascertainable. I don't see how it's ascertainable if we're talking about future conduct. 18 19 MR. WILNER: Well, again, the question for 1:53PM 20 ascertainability is whether the definition is based on 21 objective factors. And these are objective factors. 22 THE COURT: Well -- but they can't be speculative. Like 23 if the objective factor is: Are you likely to be offended if 24 your car is stopped without reasonable suspicion, I could say 1:53PM 25 that's objective. But there's no way of you have to get into

1:53PM	1	some subjective analysis: Is the person going to be
	2	offended? And when you get into will be subjected to traffic
	3	stops, traffic tickets and traffic safety, you're not talking
	4	about any collected data that the City has produced. You're
1:53PM	5	talking about somebody who says this hasn't happened to me
	6	but it may happen to me in the future and then I'm going to
	7	be part of the Class. That seems like it would be everybody.
	8	Anybody who was unless they're not committed to never
	9	driving.
1:54PM	10	MR. WILNER: I
	11	My cocounsel reminds me that in Floyd and in Plaintiffs
	12	1 through 21 v. county of Suffolk, very similar Class
	13	definitions were approved and it was it is the same issue
	14	of people now and in the future being subjected to certain
1:54PM	15	policing practices. So
	16	THE COURT: Did you know what those, what the future
	17	Class, the language of the future Class in those cases was?
	18	MR. WILNER: I can look it up and maybe I can go I
	19	mean, I could go on to address other issues while we look it
1:55PM	20	up.
	21	THE COURT: Why don't you do it as a supplemental.
	22	MR. WILNER: Yes.
	23	THE COURT: Because I haven't seen something that broad.
	24	MR. WILNER: Yes, okay, I think that's a good idea.
1:55PM	25	That will give us a chance to gather together some more

1:55PM 1 examples for you.

1:55PM

1:55PM

1:56PM

1:56PM

1:57PM

Thank you, your Honor.

So I wanted to address the relevance of the Gennaco
Report for this traffic enforcement class. And we have a
deliberate indifference *Monell* theory in this Class. That is
one of the main things that we are planning to prove.

A major part of our deliberate indifference theory is that the City can did not properly handle complaints of racial discrimination in traffic enforcement that it received through its Internal Affairs Division and through other sources.

And another important aspect of our deliberate indifference theory is that the City did not properly audit or supervise or train its officers. The Gennaco Report is not that the Buffalo Police Department didn't use best practices. It's that the practices of the Buffalo Police Department in all these areas fall below generally accepted standards and that they did so in a way that's likely to cause discrimination to continue in the future.

So, the Gennaco testimony is really there as a core underpinning of establishing the *Monell* deliberate indifference that really is at the heart of the prospective claims. And this kind of evidence is really traditional and well-trodden path to proving deliberate indifference on the part of police officials and police policymakers. So that

1:57PM 1 would be the purpose of the Monell report. It's not on Class

2 certification -- or excuse me, Gennaco Report on Class

3 certification. It's really to establish the common body of

4 evidence.

1:57PM

1:57PM

1:58PM

1:58PM

1:59PM

But when we get into the trial of this case, it will be there to show that the City is deliberately indifferent and that there is an intent to discriminate that rises to the level of a municipal policy.

THE COURT: And your deliberate indifference is which claim?

MR. WILNER: It's the Equal Protection Claim, deliberate indifference to ongoing racial discrimination.

Now the opposing counsel had criticized the injunctive relief we were seeking as not being specific. But there isn't a requirement under Rule 23 that injunctive relief be specifically enumerated in the complaint or at the Class certification stage.

What Rule 23 requires is that we establish -- and this is Rule 23(b)(2) -- that defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that generally apply to the Class. And the deliberate indifference *Monell* theory, that's our primary theory for this claim. That is exactly refusing to act on grounds that are generally applicable to the Class.

The other piece of the definition is so that final injunctive relief is appropriate with respect to the Class as

a whole. And if the Court finds or the other -- in this 1:59PM 1 case, it's an injunction so you would be the fact-finder. 2 Ιf 3 the Court finds that the City was deliberately indifferent to ongoing violations of the Equal Protection Clause, then 4 injunctive relief would be appropriate for the Class as a 1:59PM 5 whole because the remedy that would be applied would be 6 reforming those policies and practices to prevent the 7 8 discrimination from continuing.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1:59PM

2:00PM

2:00PM

2:00PM

Now it's really difficult at this stage to say what all the pieces of the relief are. Because remedies are usually handled in a separate proceeding after the liability stage, assuming liability is established. And it's often, as I said before, a collaborative process. But if it's not a collaborative process, typically courts will get briefing from both sides on what they think the injunctive relief should be. There's often a hearing. There may be testimony or evidence that's presented about the different practices and how they should be performed and the Court would use that information in order to fashion an injunction.

THE COURT: So, let me make sure I have the right starting point of how we got here. I thought the plaintiffs' position is the traffic enforcement Class is about injunctive relief and you and I had that debate about whether you need a separate Class for injunctive relief and I was saying I don't think you do and you were saying I think I do. And that's

2:00PM	1	why we're getting into "so what are we talking about".
	2	Because if the argument was one of the many things we request
	3	is injunctive relief, that's one thing. The Court is asked
	4	routinely to do that in cases, civil rights cases.
2:01PM	5	If it's I want you to certify a Class now for only for
	6	injunctive relief, then there are more specific questions
	7	about for what, for whom, who's in the Class, how do we
	8	determine who's in the Class, and that's how we got there.
	9	MR. WILNER: Mm-mm. Well, I think it may be helpful to
2:01PM	10	address this as well as part of the supplemental brief
	11	briefing.
	12	THE COURT: Okay.
	13	MR. WILNER: Because it really all goes together and
	14	maybe me saying more on this topic isn't going to help now.
2:01PM	15	But I would like to provide more of that underpinning for the
	16	Court about how these cases worked with those. What we're
	17	asking for is not something that
	18	THE COURT: But even if it, you know, mirrors, it's
	19	great if three other people do it, it doesn't mean that I do
2:02PM	20	it. So it really makes much more sense if you tell me how
	21	it's going to work in this case as opposed to telling me,
	22	Judge So-And-So in the Southern District of New York did
	23	this
	24	MR. WILNER: Well

THE COURT: -- okay?

2:02PM

25

2:02PM	1	MR. WILNER: Yes. We will definitely keep that in mind.
	2	This is a Class that is bringing claims primarily under
	3	the Equal Protection Clause for ongoing violations of the
	4	Equal Protection Clause that go towards racially
2:02PM	5	discriminatory traffic stops, traffic tickets. And we, if we
	6	establish that, that discrimination is ongoing, that the City
	7	has been deliberately indifferent to it, then we will have
	8	won the liability case and then the remedies would happen
	9	afterwards in order to redress that violation of
2:03PM	10	constitutional rights and it's a forward-looking claim. So
	11	our standing is to we have to be focused on harms that are
	12	happening now and future harms.
	13	Again, there are questions about how the injunctive
	14	relief, once it is articulated, would be managed over time.
2:03PM	15	Usually
	16	THE COURT: I'm not actually worried about that
	17	MR. WILNER: Okay.
	18	THE COURT: now. There's often recourse for doing
	19	that. Sometimes the parties have an obligation to try to
2:03PM	20	work it out themselves. That's not something that is
	21	particularly novel.
	22	MR. WILNER: Okay. In that case, your Honor, I'd like
	23	to leave you with these words from Floyd v. City of New York.
	24	"If the BPD is engaging in a widespread practice of
2:04PM	25	unlawful stops, then an injunction seeking to curb that

2:04PM	1	practice is not a 'judicial intrusion into a social
	2	institution' but a vindication of the Constitution and an
	3	exercise of the courts' most important function: Protecting
	4	individual rights in the face of the government's
2:04PM	5	malfeasance."
	6	THE COURT: Anything further in this matter?
	7	MR. RUSS: No, your Honor. I would simply again thank
	8	the Court for coming here, and for its musings. And I would
	9	suggest that as the Court reviews what has happened today and
2:04PM	10	the briefs and everything else, and look at the transcript
	11	and look at how we either did address or didn't address the
	12	Court's concerns. Thank you.
	13	THE COURT: All right. Well, we love coming to Buffalo.
	13 14	THE COURT: All right. Well, we love coming to Buffalo. It's a good food town, nice midwestern charm. We've been
2:04PM		
2:04PM	14	It's a good food town, nice midwestern charm. We've been
2:04PM	14 15	It's a good food town, nice midwestern charm. We've been here before, as the court reporter knows. So no harm in us
2:04PM	14 15 16	It's a good food town, nice midwestern charm. We've been here before, as the court reporter knows. So no harm in us coming to Buffalo. I'm going to give you an opportunity to
2:04PM	14 15 16 17	It's a good food town, nice midwestern charm. We've been here before, as the court reporter knows. So no harm in us coming to Buffalo. I'm going to give you an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' supplemental authority or brief.
2:04PM 2:05PM	14 15 16 17 18	It's a good food town, nice midwestern charm. We've been here before, as the court reporter knows. So no harm in us coming to Buffalo. I'm going to give you an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' supplemental authority or brief. So, you know, you'll have 14 days after it comes. Don't wait
	14 15 16 17 18 19	It's a good food town, nice midwestern charm. We've been here before, as the court reporter knows. So no harm in us coming to Buffalo. I'm going to give you an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' supplemental authority or brief. So, you know, you'll have 14 days after it comes. Don't wait too long to give it to me. It's not like the decision's
	14 15 16 17 18 19 20	It's a good food town, nice midwestern charm. We've been here before, as the court reporter knows. So no harm in us coming to Buffalo. I'm going to give you an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' supplemental authority or brief. So, you know, you'll have 14 days after it comes. Don't wait too long to give it to me. It's not like the decision's going to be issued tomorrow but do it in a timely fashion.
	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	It's a good food town, nice midwestern charm. We've been here before, as the court reporter knows. So no harm in us coming to Buffalo. I'm going to give you an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' supplemental authority or brief. So, you know, you'll have 14 days after it comes. Don't wait too long to give it to me. It's not like the decision's going to be issued tomorrow but do it in a timely fashion. Anything else that we can address?
	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	It's a good food town, nice midwestern charm. We've been here before, as the court reporter knows. So no harm in us coming to Buffalo. I'm going to give you an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' supplemental authority or brief. So, you know, you'll have 14 days after it comes. Don't wait too long to give it to me. It's not like the decision's going to be issued tomorrow but do it in a timely fashion. Anything else that we can address? MR. WILNER: No, thank you, your Honor.

```
Case 1:18 ev 00719 CCR Document 244 Filed 12/04/24
                                                                  102
      BLRR, et al vs. City of Buffalo, et al - 18-CV-719
1
2
 3
 4
 5
                         CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
 6
 7
               In accordance with 28, U.S.C., 753(b), I
 8
     certify that these original notes are a true and correct
 9
     record of proceedings in the United States District Court
10
     of the Western District of New York before the
11
     Honorable Christina Clair Reiss on October 23, 2024.
12
13
14
     S/ Diane S. Martens
15
     Diane S. Martens, FCRR, RPR
     Official Court Reporter
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```